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CubanMissileCrisisCIA
Page 170
170 / 354
57. (Continued
There followed an extensive discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of a military blockade, total or partial.
Tt was at this point that McNamara and Taylor presented their
schedule of alternative military strikes, copy of which is attached,
and which was the subject of continual discussion in the ensuing
meetings,
Dean Acheson then expressed his views as follows:
We should proceed at once with the necessary military actions
and should do no talking. The Soviets will react some place. We
must expect this; take the consequences and manage the situations
as they evolve. We should have no consultations with Khrushchev,
Castro, or our alles, but should fully alert our allies in the most
persuasive manner by high level people. This would include all
NATO partners, and the OAS, The President should forget about the
elections and should cancel all future campaign speeches,
; As an alternate to military action, a plan was discussed in-
volving a declaration of war and the creation of an all-out blockade.
this point indicated that he favored a blockade although in subsequent
meetings he seemed inclined towards a military strike. MeCone
gave an intelligence estimate on the effects of a blockade, indicating
its seriousness would depend upon how “hard” a blockade it turned
out to be, and finally stated that the main objective of taking Cuba
away from Castro had been lost and we have been overly consumed
with the missile problem. McCone stated that we must all bear in
mind that we have two objectives, one, disposing of the missile sites,
and the other, getting rid of Castro's communism in the Western
Hernisphere.
The meeting adjourned for dinner and in the evening Secretary
Rusk came forward with the following plan.
The United States cannot accent operational MRBMs in Cuba,
There is not much profit in preliminary exchanges with Khrushchev
and Castro because the President has said that the establishment of
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! Thompson spoke strongly in favor of a blockade. General Taylor at
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171
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