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64. (Continued) 2. It 1s possible that the USSR is installing these missiles primarliy in order to use them in bargaining for US concessions elsewhere, We think this unlikely, however. The public withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba would create serious pxoblems in the USSR's relations with Castro; it would cast doubt on the firmness of the Soviet intention to protect the Castro regime and perhaps on their commitments elsewhere. 3. If the US accepts the strategic missile butidup in Cuba, the Soviets would continue the buildup of strategic weapons in Cuba. We have no basis for estimating the force level which they would wish to reach, but it seems clear already that they intend to go beyond a token capability. They would probably expect their niaslie forses in Cuba to make sore contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the US, We consider in Annex B the possibie effects of a missile buildup in Cuba upon the overall re- lationship of strategic military power. 4. US acceptance of the strategic missile buildup would pro- vide strong encouragement to Communists, pro-Communists, and the more anti-American sectors of opinion in Latin America and elsewhere. * Conversely, anti-Coumuntsts and those who relate their own interests