◆ SpookStack

67. (Continued) 2. The 16 launchers for 1,100 n.m. MRBMs must be considered opera- rt tional now. Four of the fixed launchers for the 2,200 nem. IRBMs could a perenne ener ne tt eT CAR {probably become operational within the. next six weeks. The other four would become operational in 8 to 10 weeks. We have no direct evidence that nuclear weapons are now present in Cuba, and it is unlikely that we would be able to obtain such evidence. However 3 the construction of at least one probable nuclear storage facility is a strong indication of the Soviet intent to provide nuclear warheads. In any case, it is prudent to assume that when the missiles are otherwise operational, nuclear warheads will be available. These could be brought in by air, submarine, or surface ship. 3. We estimate that operational MRBM wissiles can be fired in een renen aren oe eight hours or less after a decision to launch; depending on the con- er + a“ . te nt ne me, foe antares Hee NEI OR Lee eae ge dition of readiness. After the IRBM sites are completed and missiles are on launcher, a state of readiness of five hours may be maintained. Both systems are believed to be provided with two missiles per launcher, providing a refire capability from each launcher after about four to six additional hours for the MRBMs and six to eight hours for the IRBMs. 4, It 1s possible that further evidence will uncover additional launch sites which are presently undetected, but the extent of our coverage leads us to believe that such evidence would not drastically