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CubanMissileCrisisCIA
Page 278
278 / 354
84. (Continued)
3. Chairman Vinson stated that he thought the speech was
good. He approved it but he had concluded that military action
would be necessary and this he heartily approved. Vinson feels
that we must dispose of the Castro problem as well as the missiles.
In this regard, I outlined my feelings as covered by separate
memorandum. Vinson tended to review the activities of the Navy
with Admiral Anderson and others, insisting that we must be sure
that we are going to do enough, that our blockade is going to be
effective, and that if we invade, we must invade with great force,
an assured victory, quick victory, otherwise Cuban resistance
will be rallied and our casualties will be great. He stated that
250,000 men would Re not enough, that it would take 500, 000 men;
that we should land/at least 10 or more points in Cuba at one time,
and if we did this, the entire Cuban population would come to our
side,
Note: Both Vinson and Russell were very inquisitive as
to the position of the Joint Chiefs. I explained this as expressed
by Taylor, pointing out that their position of a sudden unannounced
military strike was reasonable in view of their responsibilities,
however, it must also be recognized that civilians with broader
responsibilities, i.e. military and political as well, necessarily
had to moderate the JCS view. I stated that I felt the JCS view
would insure the most successful military operations with the least
American losses but that I opposed it and felt that the military
handicaps resulting from our course of action {in military operations)
must be reverted to, can be overcome by increase in the weight of
the military operation. None of the three felt that we should have
undertaken a surprise attack; however, Russell in particular felt
that a warning and a following military operation might have been
preferable to the blockade. I pointed out that the warning now had
been given and action could be taken now "at a time of our own
choosing and by means of our own determination" and after again
reviewing the wording of the speech, Russell agreed this was
correct.
JOHN A. MC CONE
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