◆ SpookStack

103. (Continued) NOTICE This report is based primarily on detailed analysis of low-altitude photography taken on Friday, 26 October, as wellas preliminary evaluation of the results of similar missions from Saturday, 27 October 1962 (Figure 1). The primary-emphasis is placed here on a technical evaluation of force readiness, pace of construction, and changes in the deployment program (Table 1). This report does not attempt to estimate Soviet intent to attack the United States. SUMMARY 1. We still have no direct knowledge of thermonuclear warheads in Cuba, but believe it prudent to assume that the Soviet missile force there is so armed. 2. We estimate that all 24 MRBMlaunchers are now fully operational, representing a capability to salvo 24 1000-mile missiles within 6 to 8 hours of a decision to launch. 3. The present and estimated operational capability of all Soviet defensive missiles in Cuba is summarized in Figure 2. 4. No new MRBM or IRBM sites have been detected in the past day, although we have not had high-altitude coverage appropriate for search since 23 October 1962. 5. Construction at the Soviet [RBM sites in Cuba continues at a rapid pace and missile support equipment is now being moved to the vicinity of ’ Guanajay Site 1, No IRBM's per se have yet been observed. 6. The entire missile-launching force at the Soviet MRBM sites in Cuba is being checked out on a rapid basis. This provides an increasing, integrated, operational readiness posture.