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4. (Continued) incompatible with Soviet policy -- and indicate a greater willingness to increase risk in US/Soviet relations than the Soviet Union has displayed so far--, 1Z, On September 20th McCons responded as follows: "Ref DIR 37228: Suggest most careful consideration te conclusion last sentence paragraph d. As an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet Cuban base will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take an unexpected riek in order to establish such a position," 13, It is reported that during McCone's absence, Acting DCI, ata masting held in Mr. Bundy's office on 10 September, proposed an overflight which would cover the entire north and south perimeter of Cuba east of Havana and out to the eastern tip of Oriente Province except for an area in the immediate vicinity of Santa Clara where four SAM sites were known to exist and had been photographed. The purpose of this flight waa to make a final determination as to how many SAM sites existed or were under construction. It is reported that because of Rusk's concern for the safaty of the U-2 in view of the Sakolin violation on 7 September and the ChiNat logs on 10 September, the sense of the meeting (particularly that of Secretary Rusk} that CIA be permitted to make 4 flights against Cuba, two peripheral and two overflights of limited penetration, including the Isle of Pines. These flights were executed between 26 September and 7 October. On the i4th of September the meating of the Special Group, JCS representative outlined capabilities for low level coverage. Secretary of Defense indicated he did not wish this operation considered until the results were obtained from CIA reconnaissance as approved on September lth, . 14. On October 4th McCone noted to the Special Group that there had been no coverage of the center of Cuba and mors particularly the entire western end of the Island for over a month, and afi flights since 5 September had been sither peripheral or Limited and therefore CIA did not know, nor could advise, whether an offensive capability was being created, DCI objected strenuously to the Limitations which had been. placed on overflights and there arose a considerable discuasion (with some heat} as to whether Hmitations had or had not been placed on ce Rawere requestad