◆ SpookStack

12. (Continued) oe - 9. On 8 September, upon learning COMOR made Cuba targets available to JRC for possible RF~101 coverage, General Carter instructed Mr. Reber to check with Colonel Steakley to determine when JRC would seek Special Group approval. , 10. On 10 September you cabled following a “Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba as such extreme costly measures a te accomplish security and secrecy not consistent with - other policies such as refugees, legal travel, etc. Appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBM's to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from over-flights. Suggest BNE study motives behind these defensive measures which even seem to exceed those provided most satellites." General Carter sent an action memorandum on 10 September to the DD/I quoting this passage and asked the BNE to undertake the neces- sary analysis. BNE's response was sent to you in an 11 September cable. The response said that BNE "still persuaded that costly crash operation to install SA-2's is reasonably explained by other than desire to hide later build-up and the Soviets likely to regard advantage of major offensive build-up not equal to dangers of U. S. “intervention. "! ll. The events of 10 September have already been chronicled in my separate memorandum. However, it was also this date that General Carter sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense calling further need to conduct tactical reconnaissance of Cuba, particularly the facility near Banes, indicating that the site would require in the near future photography of a larger scale than acquired by a U~2, and recommending that SecDef initiate necessary action to provide for employment of this tactical-type reconnaissance. -3- Nel, 41