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IdiAmin
Page 460
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CONFIDENTIAL
LORD THOMSON'S VIEWS ON PRESIDENT AMIN'S POSSIBLE ATTENDANCE AT
THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS 01 GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)
1.
After visiting 15 Commonwealth countries, Lord Thomson reports
general detestation of Amin and hope that he will not attend the
CHGM. The majority, however, consider that as a Head of Government
Amin has a right to attend. Virtually all are anxious that
opposition to Amin should not affect Uganda's position as a member
of the Commonwealth, and would like Uganda to be represented "by a
low-key delegation. Most hope that Britain, as host, will take
steps to ensure that he does not attend; but they have little or no
idea how this should be done, apart from the thought that pressure
from Qadaffi or the Saudis might help. Some suggested that we
should warn Amin about dangers to his security if he came, but one
questioned whether the UK could really claim not to be able to
guarantee his safety here when the Americans had coped with Castro
and Arafat at the UN in New York; Lord Thomson is not in favour of
relying on warnings over security to try to deter Amin, since it
would be unconvincing and, politically, unnecessarily humiliating
to claim incapacity in such a matter.
2.
If Amin were to attend it is unlikely that anyone would walk
out, although the Australians are inclined not to sit at the same
table as Amin.
3.
If we could persuade Amin beforehand not to come, all would
be happy.
4.
If nevertheless he arrived and we excluded him from the UK,
there might well be legalistic objections to the UK, as one among
36 equal member countries, deciding who should and who should not
be present at Commonwealth meetings. This view was unanimously
expressed by the Caribbean leaders, perhaps as a result of inter-
governmental consultation and/or briefing by the Commonwealth
Secretary-General. Much would depend on how we presented our
actions and the timing of them, how we prepared opinion here and
in the Commonwealth and how the Africans reacted. To act too
early could allow Amin to mobilise OAU opinion against us. Many
countries would fall in with any consensus. There is some danger
of a bandwagon of criticism developing, should anyone speak out
strongly against us. The Nigerians may be the most difficult.
Lord Thomson's view is that it is unlikely that the reaction
would be so serious as to lead to anyone walking out of the
Meeting - but probably only the Australians would speak out in our
support.
5-
Lord Thomson's judgement is that Amin should be kept away, by
carefully timed prior action if possible, but by physical turning
back at the airport at the last minute if necessary.
foreign and Commonwealth Office
11 May 1977
CONFIDENTIAL
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