◆ SpookStack

, . , . .* , - .. .. . . . . ... k.a a. .d ... . . . I a . . . . L ' . . . . I d 7. only stations rniscci fundmcntai qucstions on t?vs ?-lllCNXCrS program in thcir rcj'lics. - .'. 'a. thought that A rcJcfinition of . the scope of xhc prqr,?$ was nccdcd because - - - . . of t5c incrc~sfng,afpcjrance of U.S. catitcns 0- U.S. involvencnt in such activftics is neccs- sary to identify and monitor.linknges in foreign cf€orts abroad t o support/entouragc/ exploit -- donestic U.S. dis;l;iZencc. ... . . . ( . .i* ' . ..-. . be' m i o m o n t e d that it did not wish * ' . &' .';. . - ; .I.. : . - - .. of CIA rcsponsib5iity 'for counter intcllfgencc. - :.? *! ..-:* *:. ::t.'::.'l . .. . .::I:;: . . . t o call mt.0 qcestion tho general fornulation j.' -5.: !' - . . .. . . . 'S.7 - .. . abroad (cited in gnragraph 3 above).' It sug- . . .. . gested,. howcvcr, thnt the Station "contfnuo .. .. . . . .. . t o exercise its prc-enisrent responsibility for CI matters which .can be identified with host5:c foreign states. or..institutions.-. ..and lenvc vi-tlr activftics at hone or 'abroad which ctnmot reasonably be associated with such hostile 6 * . . - . the, FBI, as i n the $a=, concern f o r the \ . ... . , . . . -. foreign direction .IB . .- . -- . 8. Essentially CIA does exactly whet . ~ s u p g e s t t . . - * - . - - above. tion 1s sought regarding thcir forefin-related contacts and activities while abroad. the FBI-* of prior contact/involvcneat with thc Chinese COmUnfSOS - the SOI mine 1'5 Thcrc 5s 8 problcs in L!@t field stations often do .. not know the f u l l background on individuals on tchon informs- ... .. The bulk of such requirtaents '.=,..,- - on CIA originate in the Dcpartsleilt of &stice, including ~. .,.. . . Some are self-initiated when thorc is a history. - - - icts, Sorth In a l l CISCS objective . c of hostfle . t e reporting. c . .* . - 90 are individuals on' . I rrhom qu have bccn +aiscd,m I .