◆ SpookStack

sy The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (U) Key Findings “YSANE} The 11 September hijackers successfully eluded the notice of US law enforcement and intelligence as they plotted to commandeer and use four airliners as weapons, but details of their lives and activities can be used to detect cells that may follow the 11 September hijackers’ model. It should be. noted, however, that the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the Millennium bombing plot—the previous two major international terrorist operations on US soil—used tactics that are different in key respects from the 11 September model, suggesting that future sleeper cells will use a variety of measures to conceal their activities, The 11 September hijackers were all Middle Eastern ren between 20 and 33 years of age who wore a western style of dress and grooming. * The hijackers entered the US legally and used either their true names or variations of their true names. Thirteen of the 19 hijackers traveled to the US in groups of two or three—four or the remaining six were the pilots. 7 2 Once in the country, the hijackers obtained typical US identification—driver licenses, state identification cards, and commercially available documents——likely in order to avoid further use of their passports. The hijackers changed residences frequently. * The hijackers’ enrollment at US flight schools was not in itself necessarily uncommon, but their focus during simulation training on leaming only the skills that would benefit their mission distinguished them from typical students. The hijackers opened bank accounts—often in pairs—with money either they brought legally inte the US or wired from overseas. The hijackers largely avoided associating with radical Islamic groups in the US, likely in an. effort ta reduce the chances of detection by law enforcement. The hijackers’ communications techniques—face-to-face meetings, prepaid phone cards, payphones, cell phones, the Intemet, and possibly commercially available mailboxes—made it difficult to trace their operational communications. e a er oa a ae Fe lenlne 6 aan ent 5 . th pe tin ne eeepc