Reader Ad Slot
Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.
9 11 Commission Report — Part 3
Page 30
30 / 81
and “criminal agents working on 4 terrorist target had to proceed without knowing what the other
may have been doing about that same target. In short, we were fighting international terrorism
with one arm ted behind our back
The USA PATRIOT Act, enacted on October 26, 2004, eliminated this “wall” and authorized
coordination among agents working criminal matters and those working intelligence investigations
On March 6, 2002, the Attorney General issued new Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign
Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI (Intelligence
Sharing Procedures) to capitalize on this legislative change The new procedures specifically
authorized agents working intelligence cases to disseminate to criminal prosecutors and investigators
all relevant foreign intelligence information, including information obtained from FISA, in accordance
with applicable minimization standards and other specific restrictions (originator controls).
Correspondingly, they authorized prosecutors and criminal agents to advise FBI agents. working
intelligence cases on all aspects of foreign intelligence investigations, including the use of FISA.
On November 18, 2002, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issued an
opinion approving the Intelligence Sharing Procedures, thereby authorizing us to share information,
including FISA-derived information, between our criminal and intelligence investigations. With this
opinion, we finally were free to conduct our terronsm investigations with the full use and coordination
of our criminal and intelligence toals and personnel.
To formalize this merger of intelligence and criminal operations, we have abandoned the
separate case classifications for “criminal” international terrorism investigations (with the classification
number 265) and "intelligence" international terrorism investigations (classification number 199),
and we have consolidated them into a single classification for "international terrorism" (new
classification number 315). This reclassification officially designates an international terrorism
investigation as one that can employ intelligence tools as well as criminal processes and procedures.
In July 2003, we codified this approach in our Model Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy, which
was issued to ail field offices and has been the subject of extensive field training.
With the dismantling of the legal “wall” and the integration of our criminal and intelligence
personnel and operations, we now have the latitude to coordinate our intelligence and criminal
investigations and to use the full range of investigative tools against a suspected terrorist. On the
intelligence side, we can conduct surveillance on the suspected terrorist to learn about his
movements.and identify possible confederates; we can obtain FISA authority to monitor his
conversations; and/or we can approach and attempt to cultivate him as a source or an operational
asset. On the criminal side, we have the option of incapacitating him through arrest, detention,
and prosecution We decide among these aptions by continuously balancing the opportunity to
develop intelligence against the need to apprehend the suspect and prevent him from carrying
out his terrorist plans. This integrated approach has guided our operations during the past 31
months, and it has successfully foiled terrorist-related operations and cells from Seattle, Washington,
to Detromt, Michigan, to Lackawanna, New. York.
Integrating Intelligence Processes in our Operations
Although we are now able to coordinate our intelligence collection and criminal law
enforcement operations, we can only realize our full potential as a terrorism. prevention agency
by developing the intelligence structure, capabilities, and processes to direct those operations.
Without an effective intelligence capacity, we cannot expect to defeat a sophisticated and
opportunistic adversary like al-Qa’ida.
MISC DOC. #5 24 000000363
Reveal the original PDF page, then click a word to highlight the OCR text.
Community corrections
No user corrections yet.
Comments
No comments on this document yet.
Bottom Reader Ad Slot
Bottom Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.
Continue Exploring
Agency Collection
Explore This Archive Cluster
Broad Topic Hub
Topic Hub
investigation
Related subtopics
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic