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leat-armed submarine strength, nor of its ‘nuclear-armed fighter-bomber strength ithe last, of course, would not have suf- ficient range to contribute to the Soviet strike power against the U.S.). But re- cent semiofficial estimates from Wash- ington give the U.S.S.B. some 50 ICBM" 5. some 150 intercontinental bombers and some 400 medium-range missiles (the fast able to cover Europe but not the U.S.). The same sources indicate that the U.S. may have a small lead over the U.S.5.K. in the number of ICBMs. That such estimates should issue from Washington may seem surprising in view of the role that an alleged “missile gap” played in the 1960 presidential election campaign. That the estimates are realistic, however, is indicated by the statement of Senator Stuart Syming- ton that the U.S. intelligence estimate of the missile force available to the US.S.R. at the middle of 1961 was only 3.5 per cent of the number predicted a few years ago. The corresponding esti- mate of Soviet bomber strength, he re- vealed, was 19 per cent of the number predicted in 1956 [see illustrations on page 10}. Mr. Symington explained that the new figures are predicated on intelli- gence about Soviet “intentions” as well as “capability” and expressed his own dis- quiet at “the tentativeness at best of our intelligence estimates.” It is one of the purposes of this article ta attempt to elu- cidate some of these Soviet intentions. A first sight there appears to be a con- tradiction between Washington’s elaim of a marked over-all nuclear sy- periority and the recent statement by Marcha] Radion Y. Malinovsky, the So- SUAGRE NESSES EP RRPRRR AE viet Minister of Defense, that the U.S.S.R. has the power to destroy alf the important industrial, administrative and political centers of the U.S. and “whole wenciitoine thane hewn neneided thate baryi_ WML tat iar privy EMT GLIAL Bela tories for the siting af American war bases.” The explanation may be as fol- Jows. To carry out such destruction would require not more than 1,000 megaions of nuclear destructive power, say five megatons for each of 100 key targets in the U.S. and another 500 megatons for Westerti Europe and US. bases overseas. At only 100,000 dead per megaton such an attack would kill 100 million people. The U.S. stockpile, estimated at 30,000 megatons, is 30 times greater than the U.S.5.R. would need to carry out the retaliatory blow described by Malinovsiky. There is, of course, the possibility that the new U.S. estimates of Soviet nu- clear strength are too low. After all, firm in. ation about Soviet military prepa- tations is notoriously hard to come by. It seems certain, however, that the US. Department of Defense must believe the estimates to be roughly correct. It would be politically disastrous for the Adminis- tration to be found guiltv of underesti- mating Soviei nuclear strength. Bui even assuming that the estimates of the rela- “tive strength of the two sides are only approximately correct, they show that the possibility of a rationally planned surprise nuclear attack by the U.S.S.R. on the nuclear delivery svstem of the West must be quite negligible. The ques- tion of why the U.S.S.R. has built such a small nuclear delivery system should perhaps be replaced by the question of why the U.S. has built such an enermous striking capacity. Jn order to understand the possible mo- 4 tives behind Soviet defense policy, it is necessary to consider the history of the growth of nuclear-weapon power. During the period of U.S. atomic mo- nopoly or overwhelming numerical su- periority, say from 1947 to 1954, the role of the U.S. Strategic Air Command was to attack and destroy Soviet cities in ease of war. This countercity policy, like most traditional military doctrines, had both an offensive and a defensive aspect. From the Western viewpoint, under the doctrine of “massive retaliation,” this nuclear striking power was seen to be both = deterrent to the possibility of at- tack by Soviet land forces and, in the extreme “roll back,” or “liberation,” statement of the doctrine, an offensive weapon to obtain political concessions by threat of its use, By 1954 the threat was implemented by more than 1,000 intercontinental B-47 bombers, plus larger numbers of sharter range vehicles deployed around the U.S.S.R. Peam tha TFC €& RP” sc moint of view, ite BRASS RR ee er Fete We OF ee Fe ae land forces were the only available coun- ter to the Western nuclear monopoly during this period. The answer to the threat of nuclear attack was the threat of taking over Europe on the ground. fi retrospect the military reaction of the U.S.S.R. seems understandable. 11 start- ed a crash program to produce its own nuclear weapons. {t also embarked on a huge air defense program, by 1953 it was credited with an operational fighter strength of some 10,000 aircraft. As Western nuclear strength grew, the U.S.S.R. gradually built up its land forces so ag to.be able to invade Europe. even after a U.S. nuclear attack. At the political level the U.S.S.R. consolicated its forward military line by the political coup in’ 43 Jzechoslovakia and in- tegrated ../ other satellite countries more closely into the Soviet defense sys- tem. Since the main military threat then to the U.S.S.R. was from manned nu- clear bombers, the greatest possible depth for air defense was vital. During World War Hit was found that the efficacy of a fighter defense system in- creased steeply with the depth of the defense zone. Finally, the U.S.5.R. main- tained strict geographical secrecy over its land area so as to deny target infor- mation to the U.S. Strategic Air Com- mand. The doctrine of massive retaliation became less and Jess plausible as the ; po MINIMUM DETERRENT strategy of 0 nw- elear opponent of the U.S. could logically TE oe