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Peace And Disarmament Literature — Part 5
Page 73
73 / 171
PER CENT
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Tome’
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1956
1957 1958 1961
US, ESTIMATE OF SOVIET HEAVY-BOMBER STRENGTH by the middle of 196), ac-
eording to an article by Senator Stuart Symington in The Reporter, decreased by $1 per
cent between August, $956 (bar at left), and August, 196] (right). Senator Symington’s
figures were given in percentages, rather than absolute numbers, for security reasons.
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1961
1959
US, ESTIMATE OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ICBM STRENGTH similariy decreased, ec-
cording to Senator Symington, by 96.5 per cent between December, 1959, and September, 1961.
first sta, Yow levels such as those
suggested by ‘the Anglo-French memo-
randum of 1954: one million or at most
1.5 million men each for the U.S., the
U.S.S.R. and China. When the corre-
spondingly limited contributions to the
Jand forces of NATO from Great Britain,
France and West Germany are taken
into account, the armies of the Soviet
bloc would not have the capability of
overrunning Europe in a surprise land
attack.
The number of nuclear weapons in
existence on both sides, their explosive
power and the diversity of the delivery
systems are so overwhelming that no
small step in nuclear disarmament can
have much significance. In a situation in
which the U.S. has 10,000 delivery vehi-
cles and a stockpile of 30,000 megatons
of explosive (which is said to be increas-
ing at the fastest rate in its history), a
first disarmament step involving only a
small percentage reduction is not worth
negotiating. To justify the labor of nego-
tiating any agreed reduction, and to off-
set the undoubted strains and disputes
that will inevitably arise from the opera-
tion of any inspection and control sys-
tem, the negotiated reduction must be a
major one; in fact, of such magnitude
as to change qualitatively the nature of
the relative nuclear postures of the two
giant nowers
giant powers.
The simplest big first step, and the
one most consistent with realistic mili-
tary considerations, is that both giant
powers should reduce their nuclear
forces to a very low and purely retalia-
tory role. That is, each should retain only
enough invulnerable long-range vehicles
to attack the other's cities if it is itself at-
tacked, say less than 100 ICBM’s with
one-megaton war heads. This is still an
enormous force, capable of killing tens
of millions of people. A reduction to a
level of 20 ICBM's or Jess would be
much preferable. Such a reduction
would at once prevent nuclear weapons
from being used by sane governments as
weapons of aggression or coercion. It
would not, of course, prevent them from
being used by irresponsible groups who
do not calculate the cost. It is only at a
Jater stage in disarmament, when nuclear
weapons are completely destroyed, that
this danger will be excluded. It has al-
ways been clear that the ever present
danger of accidental or irresponsible
war is a cogent reason for big and rapid
steps in the disarmament process.
Dtaites studies are needed of possible
ways in which both the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S. could take such an impor-
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