◆ SpookStack

THE TECHNIQUES OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA 47 tism to those values of historical progress and_self-determination or which they had fought, amply repaid the Kremlin in a single day under the Crimean sun for the billions of rubles which had for decades been invested in fostering precisely this illusion. China succumbed from ideological contamination much more than from military supremacy. Czechoslovakia collapsed only from the ideo- logical contamination of its elite. All the Middle Kastern countries which have fallen into the “neutralist’”” camp—actually partial to Moscow—have been lured into it primarily by the charms of propa- ganda, coupled with political subversion. The decisive role of Com- munist propaganda in the rejection of the European Defense Com- munity has been previously discussed. The idea of neutralizing a reunited Germany—an idea eminently favorable to the Soviets—which gained currency in some Western circles, is due exclusively to the operation of the huge Soviet mech- anism for propagating fallacies. Should it gain widespread accept- ance, the Koenlin could have acquired the territory it desired, achieving the evacuation of American troops without firing a shot, through sheer persuasion. , It should be emphasized that no criticism of NATO’s military effort is here implied. Tndeed, this effort can only be fully endorsed. . It would clearly mean immediate disaster should the Soviets be per- mitted to surpass us in military strength, for they would not be as scrupulous as was America, which has never used its nuclear monopoly against the Soviets to promote its political aims. Once convinced it ossessed decisive superiority in weaponry, the Kremlin would prompt- y subjugate the free world without giving the least consideration to “world opinion.” We should, therefore, take great satisfaction in an adequately armed NATO, assuring its augmented efforts to the end that a a that we will not be overtaken. But it should also be recognized that, as with economic aid, this necessary and laudable military effort is not alone sufficient. Pre- cisely because NATO, by superior armament, insures against a war of missiles, it must equip itself for the war that consequently becomes crucial: the war of minds. If not, the tragic mistakes of the Maginot line will be repeated; we will be armored on one front and the enemy will pass on another. The Nazi enemy bypassed the Maginot line in 1939, through a territory which France had not defended because it had been designated “neutral.” This time the Communist enemy will pass underneath, through a political territory which is likewise not defended because due to a similar fetishism it supposedly falls exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of each separate country, and the realm of democratic tolerance. This is precisely why it is so vulnerable to enemy intrusion. The strength af the political arm in each separate country is insufficient to combat Soviet propaganda. Here, then, is a vital task for NATO to assume. Even from the viewpoint of pure military technique, propaganda had a profound influence on our efficient defense. It 1s generally assumed that a nuclear war will be won or lost. in the first 15 minutes. The Kremlin will attack instantly, the moment it concludes that the Western leaders, bound by a restive and ill-informed public opinion, will hesitate 15 minutes before initiating reprisals. At that point the hesitancy will either continue, resulting in enslavement, or it will dissipate in a holocaust. In either case disaster will have been pre- ore ore ee ee 2 a) ogee ay eM OTL