◆ SpookStack

{ i) ; THE CIVILWAR IN VIETNAM 5 sed scane THE RECENT EVENTS in the Baw of Tonkin haye 4 Fearful af the alleged “vacuum” created by the Frencti” ~ brought the world ance again to the brink of disaster. 1 ine hl, that tha eunr. reasing mili. Ayo prcuictaoae toatl tad ever: ‘increasing Hiliis ht Was Cas tary intervention of the United States in the unhappy Vietnamese civil war would inevitably léad to open con- flict between United States forces and those of North Vietnan. Amiid-t the whirl of charges and countercharges as to which side provoked the crisis. the overriding goal must be immediate negotiations to de-fuse the explos- ive situalion. Perhays never before las the United States been in a more untenable political. moral, and military dilemm than the one uaoin the steam snow confronts us in thre cami a 2 . re i jungles and the rice paddies of South Vietnam. There -de-pite official denia nent. despite -hart-lived bursts of exuberance over minor ekirmishes. despite loud assertions that we are supporting responsible government and freedom against Conununist subyer.ien—the great and powerful United States is rapidly losing respect and influence, men and miones. dignity and maneuverability, Despite American casualities in the hundreds and ex- ] aa penditures in hundreds of millions. the United States id political position in South Vietnam is becoming increasingly desperate. and our frustrated militars deaders are calling for “escalation” of the war. whieh tucans. essentedis. using auclear weapons and getting on with World War IED. -Such listeria is elogaent confirmation of the Admin- istration’s most poorls kept secret: that sixteen thou- sand crack United States military advisers and two hun- dred aud fifty thousand South Vietnam military farces, supported by extensive United Statee arms and chemical warfare techniques, can achieve no more than a etale- Tale. and possibly nal even that. against rome twenty: five thousand rages d guerrilla tighters. Obviously, these guerrillis must be receiving tremendous aid and sup- port from’ South Vietnarn’s civilian population. Hlun- dreds of thousand. perhaps millions. of Seuth Vietnam: ese are not only refusing to support their governments they are actively opposing it. Unfortunately. they are permitted no other channel for registering oppusition to their government than that of giving support to the guerrillas. Thus the Vietsam war is esse ntrally a civil war. As Senator Wasne Morse of the US. Senate For- eign Relations Committee says, There are ne Chinese in South Vietnam. There are no Russian soldiers in South Vietnam. The only foreign sollicrs in Seuth Vietnam are United tates soldicrs. (March 25. 1961.) Tt wat in 1954 Uhat the United) States interest in Sauth Vietnain, as well as in neighboring Laos and Cainmbodia, began in earnest. After almost eight years of frustra- ting hide-and-eck warfare with Vietnamese guerrilla forces. the exhausted French gave up the aArugele to retain their colunies in Indochina and joined with eight intereeted nations to negotiate a cease-fire agreement at Geneva. The temporary partitioning of Vietnam into Compnoist and “deameratic” portions, pending nation. wide cteclions. was the most significant provision of the conference agreements. “Hubert 5. Browne resides in Teaneck, N.J., aod teaches econhmice at Fairleigh Dickinson University From 1955 10 190) he worked for the Uniret States eco’ nomic aid program wi Indochina, initially in Cambodia and after 1987 in Vietnam. four combat involve: _ defeat and withdrawal. the Luited States Government banisicked a leader for the newls independent “dem- AGN PICKRCG & seauer Or fue Newsy inacpent ocratic” South Vietnam and promptly committed the resources and prestige of the United States to building a “free and independent” South Victnam to serve ae a bulwark against the epread of Conmmuni-m and as a model example of what a new society could achieve by aligning itself with the United States. Unfortunately, the virtual impossibility of implement- ing auch a program in that Jocality and at that june- ture of history was net realiaed hy our statesmen. due in Jarge measure to our abysmal iptiorance of that part of the world (e.g. when the at thor was preparing for hie assignment to Indochina ia 1955, it was impossible to find Americans in Washington wha had extensive firsthand experience in that: areal. This unreali-tic policy was further hindered by clumsy exeeution. Our choice of Mr. Diem as the leader for South Vietnam proved to be disastrous ae he and his corrupt and dic- tatorial family quickly came ty symbolize preci-ely the sort of tyranny against which our effort. were meant to be directed, «lion developed which had ity ori- fy ctor, Popular discantent with the rime a wariety fc © Mar at Mere arb ins gins i im @ teat us crucl and oppressive tactics of the Diem government was reinforced by religious and sectional grievances, The excessive economic dependence of the new govern- ment on massive injection: of United States aid. and the resultant attachment of South Vietuam 60 complete- ly to the United States glolal political strategy. of fended the sensitive nationalism of the Vairtnamese peaple. Diem’s negative responses to repeated aver: tures from the Nerth for cetablishinent of trade and other relations. and his refusal to hold eleetions for unification in 1956 as outlined in the cease-Gre agree- ments. further ageravated the dissatiefaction with the government and, hy extension. with the United States, whose hand was widely helieved to be dirceting governu- ment policy. Not surprisingly. Communist North Viet. nam. once elie had suceecded in beincing a measure of order to her own shattered ec ON. prorer ‘ded te add to the agitation and disorder shich was cagulfing the government of the South. The Diem government responded to erittisn and) ape position hy adopting a pohes of eroshing those whose views did not coincide with it} own. or jebcling them as Conmuunists—a potiey whieh has been substantialls followed by its successors. The rationale offered by the State Department fer its continuing suppost of the autocratic and unpopular Diem regime and its sue. cessors was that they. like ourselves, are intemeedly dedi- cated to fighting the Communist----an observation which totally ignores the obvious fact that. if their people re. ject them. their fierce dedication is of little avail. By 1960 sizeable portions of South Vietnan: were un der the contro] of anti-government forees. In 1961 the decision was made to introduce a major Aneriean mili: _tars presence in Victaam, By 1962 there weer estimated to Le upwards of sixteen thousand American forces statiourd there, equipped with enormous supplies of United States military gadgetry for themecives as well as for the swollen Vietnamese army. His long residence in the area as well as his marrage into @ WV c.namese faiz.- Hy have made him keenly aware of che compleuities af the ¥ictnamese situation and of the danger of exteragily imposed solucicns, whether milita-y ur political. Pa , . Pa - i eer tae Pr steppe ere Se hee | Se Re eae a ee -