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48 PEACE IN VIETNAM benefited more from the vast infusion of American weapons than did the South Vietnamese army and had, in fact, been able to use the government as a supply store. It was the highly publicized, heavy-handed treatment of South Vietnam’s Buddhists that provided the Administration with the means of getting off the Diem hook in a way acceptable to mem- bers of Congress who might otherwise have attacked it with the charge of opposing an anti-Communist government. In effect, Washington signaled to the military in South Vietnam that we had abandoned our policy of “sink or swim with Diem” and would be pleased to see the army take over. This was a calculated risk and a policy bom of desperation. For there was no assurance that the Vietnamese army would be able to establish an effective government or command sufficient popular support. But it was believed that if the army were relieved of the constraints of Diem and his coterie, it would fight more effectively. This expectation, however, disregarded several facts. First, there was a lack of unity within the army. Second, the Vict- cong had already built up its strength in the South and controlled over half the area. Third, even in that part of the country con- trolled by Diem, and particularly in the rural areas, the military Jeaders enjoyed little or no more support than did Diem. Thus, contrary to expectations, the army was no more successful than Diem, either in building popular support or in carrving out the measures necessary to secure such support. For a period of about three months following the overthrow of Diem, political controls were relaxed and the military junta headed by “Big Minh” (Gen- . eral Duong Wan Minh) gave public opinion greater freedom of expression than it had probably ever enjoyed before. However, with the coup d'état of General Nguyen Khanh on January 30, 1964, the government returned to the level of repression that had existed under Diem, and the several governments installed by the subsquent sertes of coups have been only a little less or a little more repressive. The arca of South Victnum controlled by Saigon continued to shrink. By the end of 1964 a ‘crisis was emerging, tigon ’s position being eroded at an accelerating rate, both politically and militarily. The deterioration of the military situation was reflected in a rate of desertion among new recruits that had