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Bi ee the: 1949 negotiations was one ta tical move alon z the ‘long road ‘of. he : : | firm in principle; wo should elso havo all fee flexibility pormissible and - _ Absolutely not. Tako for instance tho Chungking ncgotiations in 1945, Mao and : poaco, to show U.S. imperialsim and Chiang Kai-shek in their true colors and so “+ 48 Léborated aroas.2" Was this a betreyal of Peoplo's War? Was this "Barter. cee ne yee Sats Ses Revolution, The Chinese peoplo, through the steadfast political and military% leadership of the Communist Party hed come to learn of the real nature of the 4 a: Chaing Kai-shek, Kuomintang reactionariss, Therefore the CCP transformed the consciousness of the vast majority of the Chinese people into tho policy of in- sistins on & tarms for the basis of the necotietions., The contant of sach of - S2Stvang On © POPs 1OP th0 Cees SE Ee RY Seve ilS Mes hee Sales those points was to be struggledout, Mao statos on that subject: "We should be nocossary for carrying out cur principles," ss Pots ad se ‘ But was it always the case that oach time the Chinose Communist Party entered into nogotiations it was undor tho samo conditions and circumstances? the party decided to onter into nogotiations with the Kuomintang "in ordor to make every possivlo effort for peace and also, in tho process of struggling for holp unite and educato tho masses of poople."@0 In fact Mao and the party wore willing "to make such concessions as are nocossary and as do not damzgo the © fundamental interests of the people, Without such concessions, wo cannot «°° explode tho Kuomintang's civil war plot, cannot gain tho political initiative, cannot win tho sympathy of world public spinion in oxchange for legal status of our Farty and a state of peace,"2!° In fact the concessions were quito large ~~: Ang away the hard won efforts of rovolutionary forcos on tho battlefiold7y" Now | It was 2 tactical advance of that war. This is tho genius of Mao Tso Tung-~ G tho ability to grasp tha dialectical movomont in tho real world and to know how to resolve thoso contradictions in favor of tho masses, And it is preeisoly “" Ss aie. this whichis totally absent from tho psoudc-rovolutionary phrasemongoring of Rete the PLP loadership, Even while throwing a bone to negotiations as tactics, . the PLP proclaims tha absolute, static and counter-revolutionary character of negotiations and places it in opposition to people's war! Whilo Mao tells - 5 1)" How £0 give tit-fortat depends on the situation, © ~+” oe 3... . + Sometimes, not going to negotiations 4s tit-for- Oe " tatsand sometimes, going to negotiations is also = | .7f of seo tit-for-tat,23 Co felts It is ono thing to recognize that tho 0.5. seoks to win at the con- ference table what it loses on the battleficld, to recognize that if uses the > talks to spread confusion, demoralization and division within revolutionary ranks, and that the real victories take place in the battleficld, It is quite another thing to totally accept and publicize tho imporialists' propaganda on tho talks. The U.S, nas in no wey beon "legitimized" by the talks oxcopt perhaps in PL's ayes, The morale of the rovolutionarics end tho worldwide support for tho Vietnameso is roaching new hoights, whilo tho imporielists, treated by PL as titans who always know cxactly what they aro doing end who will undoubtedlyoutsmart tho inforior Asians, move from one dcfoat and disaster to another, kk fe ee “St 4s tree, as PL'claims, thatthe Viotnamoso lot it bo known through Wilfred Burchett that they would excercise "restraint" to givo tho imperialists no possible fig leaf ofan excuse to step up aggressions during tho talks, Pet aimperialists being what they aro, thoy wont ahoad with now provocations, . It 4s important tacticelly to show clearly again and again that tho onus of aggrossion ds on tho imporislists thoreby holring to win over the vacillating elements and onable moro peoplo to grasp the principles at stake. “he dia- . leetics of revolution and eountor-revolution, completo withadvances and re- ‘> treats, military and political thrusts, are complotely foroigh to phrase- mongerors of the PLP. We know that varicus tretics, maneuvers, ote. must be subordinated to the overall strategy of pooplo's war and are an incvitavis part of the struggle. But it is absolutoly not the task of revolutionaries, particularly those in tho belly of the beast itsolf, to arrogantly appoint | thomselves jadgoes and interpreters of every twist and turn in the struggle of © 19) iGo Pso Tung, "Roport to tho Socond Session of tho Soventh Central Commite too" (Poking: Pooples Publishing Housc, 1961) : 20) "On Fodco Nogotiations with tho Kuomintang," Vol, 4,, p. 48 21) Thid., pe We 0 ae ao ate 22} "On Gnunking Nogotdations," p. 56,° - “--25 eee a 23) Ibid.