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Cambridge Five Spy Ring — Part 13

86 pages · May 09, 2026 · Broad topic: Intelligence Operations · Topic: Cambridge Five Spy Ring · 86 pages OCR'd
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DAVID LAWRENCE J Spy Disclosures Support fions of Our Top Military iia Hipped U. S. Hand i in Korea? Were mS 500 American boys who were killed in Korea, and the more than 103.000 who were wounded, betrayed by Communist spies operating in the British Foreign Office or the British Embassy in Wash- ington? That is the big question now haine Whigeel @e a parult af thea Gilg PUSTG 25 & Debut wae disclosures thafy Donald: N face Lean and Guy Burgess were Communist agents and that « third person—a British intelli- gence officer who lived with Burgess in Washington—was the man who tipped off the other two afd enabled them to escape behind the Iron Cur- tein, Burgess was an; official in the British Embassy here. clean also served in the Embassy for a time and, theugh record was bad, he was nevertheless permitted to take ehfirge of the “American desk" in the British Foreign Office in November, 1950, under the Socialist Labor government. ‘in that very month, the Red Chinese first sent a few units of troops across the Manchurlan border into Korea and Gen. Macarthur promptly asked for permission to bomb the bridges across the Yalu and keep out any further forces. But, although the United States Joint Chiefs of Stal asked for immediate au- thority to send MacArthur such orders, the State Denart- ment: felt. obligated to consult the other 13 governments which had treops in Korea— and one of these was the Brit- Vile Sloe Ya Sach are ish. The request was made by the American Secretary of State on November 13, bat the word came back that the allies yejected it. This was highly secret. information, but evi- Genily the , Red Chinese learned thatf there was no ereat da. in their inter- vyention—ng danger of an at- tack on ft ases in. the rear —and they’wint ahead on No- vember 25 with a. full-scale intervention that turned the tide ‘of the Korean war. What did the State Depart- “oe or 1% er fe: 2 ia : 2/7 Fm ee _. ment teli the other govern- ments? How much of this in- formation passed through. the hands of MacLean tn the Brit- ish Forelan Office? What di he do with it? Senator East- land, chairman of the Senate Bubconunittes on Internal Se~ curity, has asked several ques- tions about thie in a letter to Secretary Dulles. : Viadimir Petrov. the Soviet official who defected in Aus- tralia, has established that MacLean and Burgess were for years supplying documents from the British Foretgn Of- fice to the Soviet gavernment. This became known only a few weeks ago and hes re- yived imterest in the state. meénts made by various Ameri- can military men who have suspected that somebody had betrayed them in Korea. The Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, in its “formal report last January, said: “The senior military com- manders in the Korean war theater who appeared before the Internal Security Subecom- mittee af the Senate. Commit- tee on the Judiciary believe thai possibile subversion, wish- ful thinking, European orien- tation and Allied pressure de- nied them victory ..~ “The senior military come manders in the Korean war theater , . . supped some clues to possible subversion tn Government departments, but were unable to make specific charges.” Most‘important, however, is the statement. of military doc- trine which came from one after another of the military commanders concerning enemy. behavior at the time of the Red Chinese tntervention, Gen. Mark Clark, Gen. Stratemeyer, Gen. MacArthur, Gen. Almond and Gen. Van Fleet have all indicated by their testimony that the Red Chinese ‘must have known they would run no risks by inter- yerning in Korea. Here is the colloquy at the Senate hear« ing with Gen. Van Fleet, com- manger United States 8th bsnetmn ace ro Army from April, 1951, to February, 1053: _ “@. Bo you believe that the Chinese Communists would have crossed the Yalu without esturance that our military action would be limited? = - “A. No. He (the enemy) would not have entered Ratea if he did not feel safe from at- tack in North Chins and Man- hurls.” Here ls an extract from a letter to Senator Byrd. Demo- erat. of Virginia, written by Gen. MacArthur on. April 18, 1853: “By one process or another it was. conjectured by, or con~ veyed to, the Red Chinese that even though they entered the fray in large force it would be under the sanctuary of beng relieved from any destructive acjion of our military forces within their own area.” Here is what Gen. Almond, commander of the lith United States Army Corps from Sep- tember, 1950, to July, 1951, said to the. Senate committee: “The things as they hap=- pened looked very ‘strange in- sofar as the assurance witht. which the enemy appeared Operate. I think it would have been a very hazardous thing for the Chinese to enter North Korea in the abundant num- bers In which they did if they had thought their bases of rice or ammunition or any other base would be subject to at- tack.” Who. gave the Red Chinese that assurance? MacLean was in a position to do so because he knew almost everything the Amerlean commanders would do, for he handled messages on these subjects as they passed - to and from London, Whether the information went direct to the Soviete in Moseow and then from Mos- cow to Pelping, or whether It went by way of some other intermediate capital is irrele-. vant. The elrcumstantial evi- dence points to the fact that the Soviet government had two Communist agents inside the British government: st a time . when if was vital to know what. the American milltary com- manders would be permitted to do if the Chinese Communist armies intervened In Korea. Mr. Tolaon Mr. Boardman Mr. Nichols Mr, Belmont Mr. Harbo Mr. Mohr Mr. Parsons Mr. Rosen Mr, Tamm Mr. Sizoo Mr. Winterrowd Tele. Room Mr. Holloman . Le tee a + a ee Sn rere Miss Gandy x Wash. Past and Times Herald Wash. News Wash. Star N. Y. Herald Tribune | N.Y. Mirror Daily Worker The Worker New Leader A er ne COR. Meg Danek! , (Reproduction Rp Ble secon wert bya roe wt UN ey woe tid 174% . 4 ag et ’ a Pa aren) a
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