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i : co : z commander, ~ ‘David Lawrence— : | _—-...-=_— 7a - . The evidencg of loose 5 secur- ity among § | governments . allied wiin Uniied Siates during the io war points -* now’ suspici to the grave . - posalbility that American Hves - indeed were sacrificed in that , - ” gonflict by the transmission at. ; -Amportant “military: informa, «! be tries, this question. We did not. mo 1 ne tion to. the enemy.’ Gen. Van ‘Fleet, sth Army" and Gen, Wil- ‘ loughby, who Was in charge of ‘thes Untellicanse operations af. seem eee Apes wena _the® Far’ “Eastern command, “and in fact, Gen. MacArthur | ‘ _ himself now say that the Com- munist. Chinese. must have | known that they would not be _ bombed or their planes pur- sued if they attacked United « ; Nations forces in Korea. - : The - testimony. of. Dean Acheson, ' who was Secretary “of State during the fateful pe- . “vied when American military * strategy’ was being developed; : in consultation with the allies, 2 ‘did not seem sas significant. - when given as “it is today in. ‘wWew of- the revelations of a’ “spy. ring in Faris and the, treachery of MacLean and. Burgace in the Britieh BPavalon Geen Oh Mast aelihague 2 GPSigG | Office disclosed since 1951. . For.the story told on June 1, 1951, by Mr. Acheson—who, of course, had no suspicion of any‘ looseness in the security situa- - tion among our allies—appears’ in the light of what has nap-. pened ‘since to show how dif-. ficult, if not impossible, was”: '.the-role of the; United “States, ' ag military agent of the United - ; , Nations, in Korea. - Senator Russell, Democrat,’ Loose Security i in LU. N. Countries May Have Mate)” Possible Tip That Cost 140,000,U. $, Cgsya Bee | , an 140000 4,5 aah fy 2 chen RLY Mr, Tolson a Mir, Boardman Me. Nichols Mr. Belmont —__ Mr. Harbo Me. Mobr Mr, Pars Me. Rosen : Me. Tamm sf ‘United States aircraft to de- —_— fend themselvea in the airspace over the Yalu River, to the © extent of permitting hot pur- decisions of those — autumn ‘ ‘days of 1950 is emphasized in _ the following passage from the q same testimony: Mr. Sizoo "suit of enemy aircraft up tox ““Chairman Russell: You .9 Nr. Wioterrowd —___ two or three ‘minutes’ fying “+ 3 stated you took jt up with sie Tele, Room . “time over enemy Aerritory .{ ©.) countries. I will not ask which Mr. Hollomes ' “Those telegrams resulted in’ < they “were, But I had under-: ¢ a * mee mmbew anton baleen von +h _- Miss Gandy —_ “UME CHINESHCS VEAUig Ue with i - stood - there. were some 13 na- oe ad ! the governments of those coun-'- 2 2 Hons “who'-had” contributed. Z E “troops to the United Nations ' “forces in Korea.’ Why ‘was it = confined to. six nations ‘rather’: than to: gonsult: With’ all of: ‘them? - fa * ask them to get any expression’? of views, but informed. them’ se “that they might.:in a shorti. 7 time, have to ask these: gov" 2 _ ernihents about this matter.” “Seoretary “Acheson: y have: “They discussed the ques-“" tried to refresh my memory on’ "tion with those governments, (Tthat and Ido not know. The. - and in all cases “they got “six “countries ‘which © were 7 ‘SMrongly negative responses’ “picked out were prominent and - from the governments, saying think , they thought it was dangerous, > .,, Tepresentative, and T it oe thd 2 E ee ta i oe and not desirable 3: & a " spreading the ew at. ‘eh A ‘* “Shortly after that some "or: Pa “widely itl Far cr, pd these governments - in | their 2 £ Chairman " Russe:'- In oth- 2 turn: came’ to our embassies: - : ‘er’ words, it- had a: highly 3 land -again stated that if we: were thinking about this, they’” wanted to register their view * ’ : .that it was unwise and unde” -sirable. © T° transmitted ° : "views of these governments the Secretary of Defense in a’ : Jetter, one letter dated Novem- ‘:" , ber 23, 1950, and in another’ “ ‘ seeret security rating at. thas; ee "time? - . ‘ “Secretary Acheson: Yes, sir to inform the enemy about.” ~ +. But Gen.. MacArthur, Gen. " Van Fleet and Gen. Wilidughby ee ee ee) eee ait 2 Sane 7 LISI LLY LLG EAUCLLYy itl ACL . «November 2 Ke tha was dated’ somehow, presumably from any.: ’ G “"1.) embassy source abroad, and =: “After considering these re-")” shaped. its policy—a general. .? -3 7 / re Hs sponses, it was determined be-:'' ottack—hecause it knew the ° 47 THE wait? tween the Department of State °° United, Nations ‘forces would | NOT FEY ‘and the. . Department ‘of De- a thea ee ee fawn aa . 0b that it Wao 2INL MOR awe ’ to go 2 further | with this sugges" 8 ton” . 2) Senator Bridges * asked: “What was the date when the “They: actually. attacked,” 1 a Georgia, who was chairmani. % \ “believe, " said Mr. Acheson, “on * of the Senate Armed Services | , Committee at the time of the - . “MacArthur hearings,’ asked” 4, -Mr.; Acheson about “the de-: balls of the Bo-called hot pure? Aiwa of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff where ‘they, - recommended that our planes: -be permitted: to pursue the ~ planes.of. the Communist ag-- >, RTeSSOTS oer a Manchurian . - border.* what » Mr.: . Acngson “ Te ply: 2. Some | jor to the 13th ef November; 9250, there were: . discussions be een the Dee,’ s,partmen t of: Defense andthe: - barter 0 of. State; as- thes - esult: of which’ the. ‘Depart-. Rabe Sw ™ ot eT ace weet Dene AE: , ault wg by. the Mmémbers . ent of State transmitted’ to: EG “the 26th of November. They” “had been known to be in Ko- !, Chinese Communists came in?” “* fy rea, I think, since perhaps the - we hecan to cet ranorte from? eos TEPC irom , _ the ‘edmmander. in eshief, Far:’ .» 24th of October: Certainly in. - the. early days of November, “transmit the facts about the a _cmot use airpower as a military %. -- Weapon to make & proper and. normal, milltary defense of the": oe: 0 yt: OO ec a ee ‘ The result? More than. Moi) 7 000 American casualties. And still the Europeans and not a ss few - Americans, “continue |; to 3, nooh- poch the “espionage: menace and talk about.the. in-.! significant number of enrolled: It took only one Klaus Fuchs to 4 “ { aiomic pomp. it Goubtiess. . » took- only one spy in. the - East, that units, were, in ‘orth * "French or British Foreign Of” ‘fice “to tell the Communists ash, Post and Korea. oe . So it appears that the dect-"3 ye * they were safe in risking their“ ; sion to attack on a large scales, big army on the Korean pen-, .wWas-made after our allies. in.” the U. 'N. told the Unitedi? > States emphatically. that. our’ forces could not reconnoiter -* ’ by air ta see what the Chinese <, what a. warning to Americs, Communist. troops were doing. ‘that her sons may’ face in the af.,next war operation, big or Ittle;’ «air to bamh the sunply. ines Vrs the come hazards of traashare and ‘could not fight’ back “by, in’ Manchuria trom - which : the, .Communist” Ghinese™ t. Loo 208 were being’ supported. +" sina 8 importance, fro a a, ~ insula, with the long. supply" “line. into: Manchuria “immune: ya What a tragic’ ash. Star a from attack, ay Way to conduct a ‘wart “And "ay vee Baas esaiuy Gh WraLucl ys 4 among: our, allies ity cone sey 9 “4 Communists in this’ country. : 2 Loy ane: M2 OCT 25 1954 rw" i ‘4 A Times Herald eh Nawe - Berlie £ Vs OF Y. Herald Tribune ¥. Mirror