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(eld (hiese-9./ 4 ie C ‘' : Text.of Statement Issued: oD Moscow today Donald Ma It eems , ‘speculation mf our present) whereabouts and our former ac- tivity May.represent & small but significant factor which has hitherto been used and may! again be used by opponents of | Anglo-Soviet understanding. In view of these considerations we thought it better to publish! this statement. ; “We arrived in the Soviet Union In order to-make our contribu- tion to a policy almed at achiev- ing greater mutual understand- ing between the Soviet Union’ and the West, having become, convinced on a basis of_official: information which was at our. disposal of the fact that neither the British, nor still more the American policy at that time was serlously pursuing the object. The position which we oc- cupied gave us every reason 16 think such mutugl understand ing absolutely necessary if w sh to -preserve peace, We had every reason for com ing to the conclusion that suc mutual understanding was the | object of Soviet policy. Feared fer Future We had every possibility to know the plans of a smal) but powerful group .of. men who op- posed the achievement of such mutual understanding and for this resson we had every grounds to fear these plans. When we were in Cambridze Feb. 11 (4#)—Tezxt of a etatem co toda yo missing British diplomats. Guy 7B as br@adeachy Moscow Radio; ————* Ss - s doubts and’ ~ We neither of us have ever. ‘alone, Burgess and Maclean fssued in urgess and bese-sorrét agents. «_———" Up to that moment the paths of our Uves were alike, Later the career of each of us followed a different course. For this reason it will be better to As recards Maclean, he was? | in the offictal diplormatie service: in London and Paris, Washing ton and Cairo from 1935 to 1951, thus belng part of the: machine which, with the exception of the war period, was pursuing a policy unacceptable not only to Mac- lean, but also to many others. He was by no means the only one in the Foreign Office to ex-/ press before the war his negative! attitude toward Britain's foreign’ policy, particularly as regards, Abyssinia (Ethiopia), the civil war in Spain and the Munich events, However, after the war he found himself more and more It was becoming increasingly dificult to find anyone te think SagserOliiy WA Git) BiyUE Gar alll of something else than the Com- munist menace, to understand the senselessness and danger of th American policy in the Far East -re and Europe. To remain further in the dip- lomatic service was becoming of Bu impossible. In May, were clear signs that whatever plans he may have been making jexpecting a baby. \offered other lagreed to this, he worked at/ ifirst in one of the departments| WAS ! 'caused 1951, there | derstand ~ C The latter not oniy agreed to Jorgenizé “everything paarteane 3 for departure, but he himse lalso took the decision to leave Britain. This jourhey. was too danger- ious for Mrs. Maclean, who waa) She. arrived with her children fear aee Tate Shek WHR ehee SO in the Soviet Union in 1953, As regards Burgess, having de- cided to leave Cambridge, he joined the BBC. Later, he was posts. Having of the British Secret}—Zesvise,| | describe ihem separately ; =—— - ———— and later in the Foreign Office. Durteelils time-ineapcit thized with Soviet policy. At the same time, he wag in-| creasingly alarmed by the poat- war character of Anglo-Amerij- ,can policy. No Effort for Peace . Breatest anxiety was. by the fact that at first! no modus vivendi was reached | between East and West and Ia- ter on no attempts were made to reach ijt, Neither when he was working in the BBC, when ‘he was a Foreign Office official, nor when he was connected with the pan The ‘Secret Service or counter espl- onage-—-M. I. 5—did he make a ' secret with his friends or col- leagues of his views or of the ‘fant ¢heae Le it fact inat he fad been a Com-/ munist. His views at the time he held @ aforementioned posts clearly fute the assertion that he was a Soviet agent. - This explanation of the views! reess is necessary ta un- the = circumstances which arose a week or so after ae er Se eae for his future, the Foreign Office : we were both Communists. Wel and the Security organs had ceased our political activities, their own intentions as regards not because we were to any eX- pip) tent not in agreement with , The telepnones both in his Marxist analysts of the situation office and at his home were being which we still observe a jused as microphones for listen- present moment, but because aSing in Counterespionage agents has now become clear to us, WE wrongly presumed that being Mand one of his colleagues was the service of the state we could sent, to him for-provocative pur- more than anywhere else pulinoses ~ . into pradtice our ideals. ' Decided ta Leave Wrongful Interpretation of our) oo) gig reason, Maclean de- sctiont-—the need to cease Po- cided to go to the Savies Union the service of the state—appar- ently led to the statement of the Foreign Office tyat the Foreign Office presumes Ehat we had be come Soviet € there, to the best of his ability, to the achievements of mutual understanding between Hast and West. . Argenta in Cem) rhe difficulty of leaving the bridge.: ‘¥ ; jeguntry while under police si - The “Foreign Office can, qiveillance was solved by a meet- course, presume anything 1 wishes, But what matters-ictha{ we, not the Foreign Office, lfollowed him wherever he went,! were : ‘months previously had started’ in ordet to contribute from'locking for other work, intend- ess’ decision. had decided not country while under police sur-io employ him any longer in the ing with Burgess who had just. returned to Londen from Wash-no agent would his return to London from Washington in 1951, | He visited MacLean as the, jAmelican department of the! Foreign Office. During this meeting they dis- covered that their knowledge, and appreciation of the politica) situation and the danger of war identical Further Events + The further course of events was determined by the following! circumstances. Burgess, who already“a few — ice, was faced with the fact that the Foreign Office, somewhat ater and independently of Bur- —————__—— mom rlnee Ler Wo + aptomatic service. ing to leave the diplomatic = There can be no doubt ca have fett the Mr. Tolson <. Mr fols-. Fol Bocrinar Mr. Mason Mr. Mohr Mr. Parsons t, Sizoo * Mr. Winterrowd Tele. Room Mr. Holloman Miss Gandy However, at the dectaive mo- | | m Stem Win Ad he a Ww méi-Barstss had whether he wished or could do! work for which he was striving, | without acting against. his own! conscience, co oe H For this reason, when Mac-' ‘lean told Burgess that he him-' (Self had decided no longer to work for the Foreign ‘Office and. its policy, and also proposed that! bath of them should goto the: USSR, it was not difficult for Burgess te-agree'to this. “"" —- Gly there, it seemed to them, | was & possibility to put into! Practice in one form on another’ the convictions which they hed! always held, . | Our life in the Soviet Union has convinced us that we took that we took, that time the correct decision. We are handing cut this statd- | ent for publication in the presk. (Signed) Donald Maclean, G rgess. aS oe Wash. Post and Times Herald Wash. News Wash, Star —Aef-—__. N. Y. Herald Tribune N. Y. Mirror N.Y. Daily News -_ Daily Worker The Worker New Leader o _ . eo rs ag ey wOT RECGONDiD ; aTtington, where he was_cccounying Forelen Office on his owrr-mitia- > n 5 5 7 » competent in this question. _la-post—mr'the British Embassy tive. “| ‘6 FES 28 256 ? S ! G Ge ott? OED BG RcY 6. ms Fates oat : “