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4 KIM PHILBY’S SILENT WAR continued relevant Foreign Office list left me in hittle doubt about the identity of the source in the British Embassy. A careful study of the files did something to allay my immediate fears [for the source's safety]. As SJS was not supposed to operate inside the U.S.. investigation of the leakages was in the hands of the FBI. Characteristically, they had put in an immense amount of work resulting mm an im- Tense amount of waste paper. It had so far occurred neither to them nor to the British that a diplomat was involved, let alone a fairly senior diplomat. Instead. the investigation had concentraled on non-diplomalic emplovees of the embassy, and particularly on those locally recruited: the sweepers, cleaners. botile-washers and the rest. A charlady with a Lai- vian grandmother, for instance, would rate a 15-page report crowded with insignificant detail of herself. her family and friends. her private fe and holiday habits. it was testimony to the enormous resources of the FBI, and to the pitiful extent to which those resources were squandered. ht was enough to convince me that urgent action would not be necessary, but that the case would require minute watching. I MADF MY FIRST SLIP almost im- mediately after entering American territorial waters. An FBI a eiloattc 1 oreet om out in th. aunch ia . = Outi Me Prowl s waUACH 1G ZTE Mic. representative had ci I gave him a glass of Tio Pepe which he sipped unhappily while we made polite conversation. | was later 10 deat thay the men of the FB], with hardly an exception, were proud of their insularity. of having sprung from the grass roots. One of the first senior G-men ] met in Washington claimed to have had 4 grandpappy who kept a general store at Horse Creek, Missourl, They were. therefore, whisky-drinkers, with beer for light refreshment. By contrast. CIA men flaunted cos- mopolitan postures. They would disduss absinthe and serve Burgunds above room temperature. This is not just flippancy. Ht points to a deep social cleavage between the two organiza- hons, which accounts for at least some of the rift berween them. In Washington, my predecessor. Peter Dwyer®, met me and explained. over our first Bourbon, that his resignation had nothing to do with my appointment to succeed him. For personal reasons, he had Jong wanted to settle in Canada, where a congenial government post was awaiting him. The news of my posting to Washingion had simply determined the liming of his northward move to Ottawa. So we started on a pleasant footing. Nothing could exceed the care and astute- ness with which he inducted me into Washington politics. Tt is nol easy to make a coherent picture of my tour of duty in the United States. It was too varied, and often too 2 Now assuiate director of Ihe Canady Council in Ottawa EB The Canadian povernment apparentls never did set up a secret service as auch Internal xccurny and counter -espionage are bandied by the ROMP APRIL, E968 i ‘ j i i a oie siete mete ee bode amorphous, to be reduced to simple terms. Liaison with the FB] aione, if it had been conducted thoroughly, would have been a full-time job. It was the era of McCarthy in full, evil blast. It was also the era of Hiss. Coplon, Fuchs, Gold. Greenglass and the brave Rosenbergs — nol to mention others who are still nameless. Liaison with CIA covered an even wider field. ranging from a serious atlempt to subvert an East European regime to such questions as the proper exploitation of German secret documents. In every question that arose, the first question was to please one party withoul offending the other. In addition. | had to work with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and with individuals in the Department of External Affairs who were dickering with the idea of setting Up an independen? Canadian secret service’. Where to begin? As the end of my story chiefly concerns the FB], ] should perhaps concede to CIA the beginning. The head of the organization when J arrived was Admiral Hillen- koetter. an amiable sailor who was soon to give way to Gen- eral Bedell Smith without leaving much of a mark on Ameri- can intelligence history. The two divisions with which I had most to do were the Office of Strategic Operations (OSOQ) and the Office of Policy Co-ordination (OPC). In plain English. OSO was the intelligence-gathering division and OPC was charged with subversion. The 4-: ant GT as Jim Angleton, who had formerly served in London and had earned my respect by openty rejecting the Anglomania that disfigured the young face of OSO. Although our discussions ranged over the whole world. they usually ended, if they did not begin. with France and Germany. The Americans had an obsessive fear of Com- munism in France. and 1] was astonished by the way in which Angleton devoured reams of French newspaper material daily. That this was not a private phobia of Angleton’s became clear at a Jater dale when a British proposal for giving French imelfigence services limited secret information was firmly squashed by Bedell Smith in person. He told me flatly that he was not prepared to trust a single French official with such information. ng force of OSO at the time + |. HAD FEWER fears about Germany. That country concerned hini chiefly as a base of operations against the Soviet Union and the socialist states of Eastern Europe. CIA had lost no time in taking over the anti-Soviet section of the German Abwehr [part of Hitler's secret service]. under Won Gehien, and Angleton often de- fended, with chapter and verse, the past record and current activities of the Von Gehien organizations. Secret activity of all kinds. including operations directed against the German authorities themseives, were financed by the Germans, as part of the payment for the expenses of occupation. Apart from Angleton, my / continued on page 74 17 een one