◆ SpookStack

- keep an eye on him, He seemed () was still sending us reams about py that there was someone else wis was ready to share the responsi- bility. In the licht of what was to come, my decisivn to fall in with Burgess’ suggestion looks like a bad mistake. of T have indeed given it much thought _ in the past fifteen years. It will not do to plead that the twist events were to take a few months later were utterly unforeseeable; security precautions are designed to give protection from the unforeseeable. _ But, on reflection, I think that my -decision to accommodate Burgess” . speeded by a few. weeks at most the thé Embassy charladies, and the enquiry into our menial personne] was spinning itself out endlessly. To me, this remains the most in- — explicable feature of the whole af- fair. There was already evidence that the Foreign Office had been - penetrated. Both Krivitsky! and . focussing of the spotlight on me, . It also lent vigour to the letter which Bedell-Smith sent the Chief insisting on my removal from the scene, It may even have been lucky ~ . that quspicion fell on me premature- ly, in the sense that it crystallised <— ’ before the evidence was ’ enough to bring me to court. Burgess’ arrival raised an issue . that I could not decide by myself. atrong Should he or should he not be let into the secret of the British Em- - bassy source which was still under investigation? The decision to ini- tiate him was taken after I had made two lone motor trips to points outside Washington. I was told that the ini Guy’s special knowledge of the prob- lem might be helpful. I therefore took Guy fully into our confidence, briefing him in the greatest detail, _ and the subject remained under con-, _ Stant discussion between ua. My dif-. that 1 had only seen ficulty ws: Maclean tvice, and briefly, in four- teen years. I had no idea where he ~ ‘lived, how he lived, or indeed any- Sang et ci about his circumstances. But iv is now time to turn to the tase, to explain how it stood, and th. problems {t involved, = | "Tie &:velopment of the affair was ffivins Tus deep anxiety, It was be- wt by iyponderables, the assess- .tiich could be little better fucoswork. We had received sty Mal tous: come dozen reports referring to the - Volkov had said sc. There was, of course, nothing to suggest that the three sources referred to the same man. There is still no basis for that supposition. But if the assumption “had been made, if in particular the . Krivitaky material had been studied ‘in relation to the Washington leak, - a search among the diplomats would have started without loss of time— "perhaps even before I appeared on © - the acene. But another feature of the case ‘was even more puzzling. I must con- fesa to having enjoyed a great ad- vantage in that I was pretty certain from the beginning who was in- me ‘Oa look into his shaving-mirroy._ a4 find inspiration there. Once in-— a vestigation of the diplomats started,” ° it would certainly yield the right |. answer sooner or later. The great question was: how soon? how late? =| From discussion with my frienda at meetings outside Washington, two main points emerged. First, it waa essential to rescue Maclean be- tion was raised about his future \ potential to the Soviet Union in the .fore the net closed in on him. That —” ; was accepted es an axiom. No ques- ~ “event of hia escape. It was quite .-- enough that he was an old comrade. - . Some readers, prisoners of preju- . dice, may find this hard to swallow, volved. But, even discounting that - advantage, it seemed to me quite obvious, from the nature of the re- * ports, that we were not dealing with “the petty agent emptying waste- ‘ paper baskets and anatching the balance of opinion was that | ‘odd carbon, Some of the reports dealt with political problems of some complexity, and on more than one occasion Homer was spoken of with respect. There could be no real doubt that we were dealing with a ‘man of stature. The reluctance to initiate enquiries along these lines ‘can only be attributed to a genuine mental block which stubbornly re- sisted the belief that respected _ members of the Establishment could _ do such things.’ The existence of L143 '\ puch a block was amply borne out :guree, who appeared in the docu- . ty te under the code-name Homer, b..., little progresa had been made © Aowerds identifying him. The FBI ~ by the commentaries that followed the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess—and for that matter, my own. Explanations of extraordinary | silliness were offered in preference .. to the obvious simple truth. Yet I knew quite well that this . bizarre situation could not go on forever, One day,.any day, some- ‘ body in London-.or Washington - J was supposed to be chivvying Ger- — - -mans in Spain. In short, our duty I do not ask them to do so. But they cannot blame me if they suffer un- - - pleasant shocks in future cases. Sec- >. - ‘ond, it was desirable that Maclean - should stay in his post as long as possible. After his departure, it was said blandly that he was “only” head of the American Department _ of the Foreign Office, and thus had little access to high-grade informa- tion. But it is nonsense to suppose S that a resolute and experienced op- erator occupying a senior post in . the Foreign Office can have access ° only to the papers that are placed ‘on his desk in the ordinary course . of duty. I have already shown that “ I gained access to the files of Brit- ish agents in the Soviet Union when was to get Maclean to safety, but ’ not before it was necessary. But there were two further com- plications. I had been sent to the United States for a two-year tour of duty, and I could therefore ex- “pect to be replaced in the autumn ~ ” 1Soviet intelligence officer Walter Kri- - , Vitaky defected to the West in 1940, bringing with him secret information about an unidentified Soviet agent in ~ Britain's Foreign Office —Ede. of 1951. I had no idea what my next _ ‘posting would be; it could easily have been Cairo or Bingapore, far’ - ‘out of touch with the Maclean case. — Groping in partie] darknesa as we | '. were, it seemed safest to get Mac- — lean away by the middle of 1951 at : the latest. The second complication © | arose from Burgess’: position. He was emphatically not at home in the Foreign Office, for which he had neither the right temperament nor the right personality. He had been ‘thinking for some time of get- ot wet a . 1 her eee Se ce ee es ne ed. wh ee eee ee