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. fsccee de — ~. Bes \ P: fe: hoe Paicw: . a pa. wad - f bone fe i i : ee ¥. . f qo t. foray oT ree pers Peton ante j eer rsr Th ie + t + ae Ps | i ‘loa : i ,- 218d. AES hep EEE rgper “ern age . saying too much. eo, 14910 Former Foran Office 7 NOVEMBER 1955 Officials—-Disoppearance . Mr, Daines : Wil} the right hon. Gentle- man tell us the status of the chief officer in charge of security at the Foreign Office? Mr, Macmillan : The Permanent Under- Secretary, the Head of the Department. The status of the officer upon whom this would mainly devolve would be that of an Under-Secretary. Glgee te Stee cee bots, Having made that point, there is just one other point that 1 should like to ‘make before F come to the details. All through the criticisms which have been made—] do not complain of them—lI have felt a sense of impatience, and, indeed, natural impatience, that action of a pre- cautionary kind was not taken or could not have becn taken when it mighi still have been effective. I am bound to say that ] think some of these complaints are based on a misapprehension of the rights of a citizen in a free society in time of peace. ¥ shall revert to this point at a ater stage, but I should like to mark it I would only venture to add this warn- ing. Action against employees, whether of the State or anybody else, arising from suspicion and not from proof may begin with good motives, and it may avert seri- OSs inconveniences or even disasters, but, judging from what has happened in some other countries, such a practice soon de- ecnerates into the satisfaction of personal vendettas or a general system of tyranny, all ia the name of public safety... --- — Now I should like to say a word on the question of the handling of publicity. I is said that the statements made either Foreign Office spokesmen or by Ministers during all these years have a disin- genuous and obscure. Why, it is asked, was not more information given earlier in greater volume and spontaneously? Of course, I do nol intend to try to con- vince the House that everything that has been done by myself or my predecessors has been absolutely right and prudent in .every detail. Happily, there is very little experience of this sort of thing jn our country, and successive Ministers have not found it easy to strike just the right balance between saying too little and T am sure, however, that they have all been influenced by one over-riding con- sideration. Naturally, the disappearance ane me az ae Tee . ars i te al” een ion field of investigation for the Security Ser- vice. These inquiries continued for a Jong time ; indeed, for several years. At any stage while they were in progress a full statement would have indicated. t 1 t the world the degree to which they were : Meeting with success, Consequently, as anyone with any experience of this kind - of work knows, the investigation itself might have been compromised. if one is working on a line which may lead to success and perhaps to prosecution, the Jess one talks about it the better and that is what we meant by the paragraph in the White Paper when we said: 0 a); “" “Counter-espionage depends for its success on the maximum secrecy of its methods, Nor is it desirable at any moment to let the other side know bow much has been discovered oF guess al what means have been used 10 Giscover HP ee Mg ey This governed the problem of the timing of public statements... <5 th eto Uniess we were to pubjish a kind of running commentary such as would have been highly prejudicial to the work of the Security Service, we had to decide on the right moment for telling what we tnew of 1 far imittere einer Weaeee eaters See Baek PLS Oe ee ee decided wisely or unwisely, but the para- mount consideration—and 1 want to emphasise it—was for facilitating the work of investigation in its widest sense and, above all—and perhaps this is the most i t 7 a ee a th ee ee : . ob important point—of pot endangering ~ Valu able sources, eee tg --- It is worth looking back to the way ta which the case developed. When Mac and Burgess fied in May, 1951, the first thought of those responsible had to be — not how much they could tell the public, but what they could do to minimise the harm that had been done. The Security Service still had extensive inquiries to make, not merely to reconstruct the but to improve the Service, But whea Petrov defected on 3rd April, 1954. s whole new vista on the case was opened BP -- Gn 3id May. 49547 the ~Ausiral Government set up a Royal Commission and it was clear that the hearing of Petrav’s testimony in many matters—in many Matters quite unconnected with Maclean and Burgess—was to be a vita] pari of the work of that Commission. From then on his credibility as a witness was to be under examination, We knew in April. 1954, that the Australian Government ia- Ausiralian ~ ert kere 7 * dean bled 7 : of the two men opened up a large new tended to set up a Royal Commission. — 77 Teeper ; wis Slew oe 4CH tat Geet Te rin vam a a a ae ius Ege crepes ’ owe an ; ae eet ns eee ° . : ° OP ape eR OO RENE Re mar ER eee epee a crhta nacelle al dati oe oT a are ee : . ‘ yt ee tee er ~~? . oe ome