◆ SpookStack

1497 ° Former Foreign Office There was much discussion as to his future post. him fo 4 post where his general suitability for the Forcign Service could be properly tested. It was, therefore, decided to send him to Washingt ton for a Period of trial} Sai on routine wor There have ara we aoe * that, heen eye sueces <i ions) £ SCSHORS , having been guilty of serious indiscre- tions, he was promoted. That is not so. He remained, as he bad been since his + grade of the junior branch of the Ser- j tice. : i } in Washington, Burgess was a failure, The Ambassador reported un- favourably both upon his office work and upon his behaviour outside, and in May, 1951, four years after his establishment and nine months after his appointment at Washington, he was recalled, and _ conclusion was reached that he Contd have to leave the service. Until the day _ Of Burgess's disappearance there were no rounds for suspecting that he was work- ing against the security of the State. He had been indiscreet, but, then, indis- cretion is not generally the characteristic _ Of a secret agent. | ( become available to the Soviet authorities / ueountry to conceal from a man the fact ~ ee 8 - There is one further point that I think, in fairness to the late Mr. McNeil, 1 ought to mention. JI observe that a former Minister and Privy Councillor recently slated that he had warned McNeil about Burgess when he became his personal assistant. I am bound to Bay that IT feel very corry about the Sere a7 “J petits timing of this particular r revelation, $o much for the official careers of the two men. I think that J bave said enough to show that it simply is pot true that they were protected by senior officials. It may be argued that their superiors ought to have known more about them, and I shall have something to say later sbout the subsequent improvements in the Foreign Office system of reports on the ot siali. “"Vimust now deal with the other ques. tions which I posed about the esca ibe two men, the competence the measures taken to keep Maclean under observation and how he got warning of it. To understand the problem, ] must ‘first say something of the background. It was in January, 1949-—a very im-*.. portant date—that a report was received | 4 NOVEMBER 1955 a few It was desirable to send no in ication as to how it had become , Bvailabie. ‘been from British sources. . ne ope yee 1498 ears earlier,” However, there was Officlals ~Disappearance The feak might not even “s Diligent inquiries were beeun imme- . atcly, but the field of possibilities to be covered was very large. Further evidence —whirh wae availahte when the ~ wT eRe wes 7 ewe a GE ae WE Bud Le nant investigation began—gradually came to light, and it is, in fact, greatly to the .....,.. credit of the security authorities that the establishment, a member of the fourth circumstance in which (hat information had leaked to the Soviet Government became known at all. I cannot give the =- - details, but it was an almost incredible act of skill that, given the magnitude - of the task, how broad the possible field was and the paucity of the information .. available, the ficld was narrowed down in the course of two KO Years [to one suspect, and that the right one full details of the investigations, but 1 -" hope that it will accept my assurance ” that they were pursued with diligence and efficiency. But, \ to support a prosecution lay ia obtaining admissions from him. But there was no firm starling point for an interview with him. It was highly desirable to obtain furiber information about his contacts’ © and activities which could Be used as a season for questioning him..-. STB Th OF hab ‘Yor the primary purpose—indced, the sole ” purpose —of securing such information. ~ As was said in the White Paper, every- thing depended upon the interview, and -- “#8 SUCCESS depended an element of surprise. If he were alerted —-: - to the fact that he was under investigation — or suspected it, all hope of obtaining the essential confirma probably have gone narrowed down to Maclean, the evidence was both inconclusive and circumstantial, The best, perhaps the only, chance of oblaining evidence which could he need gradually The House will not expect me to give even when suspicion So) — iach tal ati lalla taheal etait ve Be “A watch was, therefore, put upon iin ed also on the use of © evidence, would. For that reason. the decision not to ~~ watch him at Tatsfield was deliberately ‘taken after a careful survey had been “~~ made of the technical problems involved =. in keeping him under observation in the . neighbourhood of his home. The con- clusion was that the risk that he would put on his guard would be too great. that certain British information had Obviously, it is far more difficult in the uc we ee yt me - vee ~ 24. FT Eee I peepee en graeme Pmt an ee . - oe oe “s or good. tag > DoT er _ whe oer os oo peniek Pee EO, tee tg | ete a a - Atte earn * ? rere + Ts { ge RS eee Oe SY —— a he. eT RT aN pa poe ee —r ¥ % r4 4 Rel vd {| | | wee 8 Te ) ' H be