◆ SpookStack

Nos. 77-1698, 77-1210 & 77-1370 57 State defendants Jalovec, Sorosky, and Meltreger con- tend that they are absolutely immune from liability for their participation in the IID investigation. In our earlier review of Sorosky’s and Meltreger’s claims for absolute immunity, Hampton I, supra, we observed that the plaintiffs essentially alleged that these defendants had engaged in “the deliberate preparation of perjured testimony.” Jd. at 609 n. 9.3! We concluded that such con- duct “clearly exceeded the scope of their quasi-judicial immunity.” Jd. Since our decision in Hampton I, however, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Jmbler v. Pacht- man, supra. Applying that decision, we recently held that prosecutors who with local police allegedly destroyed and falsified a line-up report and police tapes of incoming phone calls, were protected by the doc- trine of absolute immunity. Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 482 (7th Cir. 1978). The actions of Jalovec, Sorosky, and Meltreger at the IID investigation con- stituted failure to prevent conduct which was essentially indistinguishable from the prosecutorial activity encap- sulated in the allegations in Heidelberg. Thus, we are compelled to conclude that Jalovec, Sorosky, and Meltreger are absolutely immune from liability for their actions at this hearing. B. Federal Defendants: Absolute Immunity The federal defendants, Johnson, Piper, Mitchell, and O’Neal, seek absolute or at least qualified official im- munity for their allegedly illegal actions. They rely on Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), as the basis for their claim to absolute immunity. But as we noted 31 Today we hold that plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence against Sorosky and Meltreger to warrant submis- sion of the conspiracy claims against them to a jury. We do hold, however, that there was sufficient evidence supporting the section 1986 claims against them. While Imbler expressly discusses only section 1988, its reasoning applies to the 1871 civil rights statutes generally, see Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 369 (1951), and thus should be applied to claims brought against prosecutors pursuant to section 1986. a |