Reader Ad Slot
Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.
Fred Hampton — Part 3
Page 80
80 / 251
76 Nos. 77-1698, 77-1210 & 77-1370
of 1976 [the Act], Pub. L. No. 94-559 (Oct. 19, 1976),
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We grant the request for an
award of attorneys’ fees for their appellate work, but
hold that plaintiffs presently are not eligible to receive
an award for their trial endeavors.
Section 1988 as amended reads:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision
of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this
title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
This court has recently held in Davis v. Murphy,
587 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1978), that the Act permits a
prevailing plaintiff on appeal to receive fees for
appellate work. Accordingly, we have the discretion to
award a reasonable fee to plaintiffs as part of their
appellate costs unless special circumstances render such
recovery unjust. Fed.R.App.P. 39. See also Wharton v.
Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977). A review of the
record fails to disclose any special circumstances which
would render an award inequitable.“* No affidavits have
been submitted by plaintiffs, however, to support their
request. Therefore, plaintiffs should submit to this Court
a statement of the fees requested supported by any rele-
vant material and in affidavit form. Defendants shall be
afforded an opportunity to respond. Employing the stan-
dard expressed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), factors bearing on the
amount of the award will include
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the question presented; (3) the skill re-
quired to perform the legal services; (4) the preclu-
sion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee in the
48 The state defendants argued in a motion to strike the
“Anderson” reply brief that plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’
fees is not a proper subject for consideration because the
request was not raised in plaintiffs’ opening brief. Plaintiffs,
however, did assert the statutory basis for attorneys’ fees in
their main brief although the argument was directed to the
federal defendants.
Reveal the original PDF page, then click a word to highlight the OCR text.
Community corrections
No user corrections yet.
Comments
No comments on this document yet.
Bottom Reader Ad Slot
Bottom Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.
Continue Exploring
Agency Collection
Explore This Archive Cluster
Broad Topic Hub
Topic Hub
letter
bureau
Related subtopics
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic