◆ SpookStack

Nos. 77-1698, 77-1210 & 77-1370 85 that the judge permitted the fallen pitcher and broken glass to remain on the floor after the jury returned to the courtroom. While we do not intend to condone Taylor’s gesture of anger, we are convinced, in the words of Judge Duffy in his dissent in McConnell, “. . . there was no interference with the conduct of the trial. There was no obstruction in the administration of justice.” Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 294 F.2d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 1961). And the euprenis Court agreed with Judge Duffy’s appraisal in at case. What we have said about Taylor’s complained-of con- duct applies to Haas’ conduct as well. Haas was held in contempt for saying “we can’t cover up the coverup.” After saying this, he tried to explain: “That is part of our complaint, that they covered up, Judge.” The judge, however, took the remark as personally directed at him. In the context of what had happened before, the judge, in our opinion, had no reason to interpret the remark in that manner, and should have given Haas the benefit of every doubt. This court’s statement in In re Dellinger is pertinent: While McConnell cannot’ be read as an immuniza- tion for all conduct undertaken by an attorney in good faith representation of his client; it does re- quire that attorneys be given great latitude in the area of vigorous advocacy. Appellate courts must ensure that trial judges (or the jury on remand) are not left free to manipulate the balance between vigorous advocacy and obstructions so as to chill effective advocacy when deciding lawyer contempts. Admittedly, the line defies strict delineation (Gold- farb, The Contempt Power, 172 (1971) ), but by our resolving doubts in favor of advocacy, an indepen- dent and unintimidated bar can be maintained while actual obstruction is dealt with appropriately. * * & Attorneys have a right to be persistent, vociferous, contentious, and imposing, even to the point of appearing obnoxious, when acting on their client’s