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Memorandum to Mr. E. 8S. Miller RE: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE - PURPOSES ON THE SYMBIONESE LIBERATION ARMY (SLA) IN THE PATRICIA HEARST CASE all of the provisions and guidelines contained in the Rule. While Mr. Dalbey, who advocated the F.R. Cr.P. 41 route, cited U.S. v. Focarile as precedent (use of F.R. Cr.P. 41 by the Bureau of harcotics to obtain a warrant to place a pen register), it would appear the decision supports a broad interpretation of the items allowed to be seized under F.R. Cr.P. 41, and modifies its Gisclosure timing, but does not obviate the - difficulties ef probable cause. An avenue which might be open to us issimply to approach a USDC with the Keith decision in one hand and an affidavit supporting our reason to believe that the surveil- lance requested may produce intelligence information which could break the Hearst kidnaping caso, and give us an oppor- tunity to thwart future SLA activity detrimental to the national security. 4. Our argument to the USDC would be that he has authority, under the Keith opinion, to approve our petition for an intecLli-~ gence electronic surveillance. We would not attempt to cite any particular procedure by which we were making the applicatica, arguing that 211 Keith opinion requires is interposition of @ judicial officer between the President's agents and the person to be surveilied, and that the Supreme Court did not attempt to define the means by which such an application is to be made, In concluding its Keith opinion, which held that dome stic intelligence electronic surveillances were sibject to the Fourth Amendment requirement of prior judicial review, the court said: tvoreover, we do not hold that the same type of standard and procedures prescribed: by Title III are necessarily applicable to this case. We recognize that domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of “ordinary trime.” The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrela- tion of various sources and types of infor- mation, The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult toidentify than in -3- CONTINUED-OVER ~ = a ST = a = > whe ea eee ewe Pee wat _. . - Pn a 7 7 Re ae gh a nn ee aR ie ee teat aS a ae See ard at oe ee