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’ enc | j: ry i APRIL 74, 1947 view, Pétain was and still is a patriot who did better than de Gaulle could have done. On July 1, 1940, Bullitt cabled thet the hope of Pétain and his associates was’ “that France may become Ger- many's favorite province—a new ‘Gau’ which would develop into a new Gaul.” When Bullitt returned to America at the end of the month, he said, ‘Pétain is thoroughly honest and straightforward . . . univer- sally respected . . .- doing his best to bring order out of desperate chaos.” Langer comments “What concerned the American government was not the question of ide- ology, but the question of national interest.” Two quo- tations on which Langer doesn’t com- ment are particularly striking as oblique illuminations of the question of a definition of national interest. On June 26, 1941, Roosevelt wrcete to Admiral Leahy about the Nazi attack on Russia, “It will mean the libera- _.tion of Europe from Nazi domina- tion... and at the same time I do not think we need worry about any possi- bility of Russian domination.” Lange: makes plain that Ambassador Bullitt, Admiral Leahy, Robert D. Murphy and nearly all the others responsible for our policy disagreed with the President, feeling that ideology coincided with real national interest when it was anti- Communist, but not when it was anti-Fascist. Langer quotes Laval as having re- marked to Hitler, “You want to win the war in order to organize Europe; you would do better to organize Europe in order to win the war.” He calls the’ remark discerning but wa loesn’t mote that the criticism of Eiit- let's policy applied just as forcibly to our Vichy policy. HE second and most iorportaat phase of the Vichy policy began in the autumn and winter of 1940 when, again after Bullitt’s personal in- tervention with the Presi- dent, Murphy was sent to North Africa to conclude the economic deal with Wey- gand. Although this part of the book only scratches the surface, it is vitally impor- tant because it suggests the tole of powerful American interests in favoring 2 cox- nection with such "safe" efe- ments as those represented by Pétain. Names like A. G Reed of Socony-Vacuum and Wallace Phillips, 2 wealthy American indus- trialist in England, crap up. Phillips “had much to do with the selection” of the team of Murphy's “technical as- sistants,” who later helped him make it seem that the policy of political - and economic expediency whicdr had been Isunched in 1910 had been de cided upon two years Iatec and only for military rea- sons. At this point and 2 dozen cthers when the reader begins to went to kgow more, Langer throws in such phrases as, “It would be both tedious and unnecessary to pursue in all detail the work- ing out of the plans.” Langer dwells lovingly for many pages on deGaulle’s blunder at St, Pierre and Miquelon, amd dismisses in a phrase the fact that we wasted a year on “the idea that Wey- gand could be made into another de Gaulle.” At the start of 1942 when the British were accurately estimating de Gaulle’s strength, Hull was tellieg the President that “some 95 percent of the entire French people are anti-Hitter, _ whereas more than 95 percent of this latter number are not de Gaullists and would not follow him.” Langer finds it “extremely difficult and fortunately not really necessary” to describe the Resis- tance movement and then gocs oa ts give details about the reactionaries with EAVAL whonr >Bfurphy chose to work. The Wormss 5 Bank collaborators get many pages, ithe He Gaullist resisters a few pradgrmg paragraphs. The misstatement Of the “acts about de Gaulle is under- stardaZide; but it is astonishing to find Langer: sexe now defending our link with Euawilis regime in Vichy in the sommersesibf 11942 as “our only connec- tio weith:'fhe mass of the French people: i . | eet its account of the Colonel Saalborg affair, which is grossly unfair, ‘the:fmal portion of the book, om the: =preparations for the North Afri- cm txecsion and the landings them- selves, camizkes fast, cxciting reading in the berst:lclodk-and-dagzer tradition. It appenss ‘that Bullitt also was primarily responessble‘fer this, the third phase of the Viechy policy. In Cairo in Decem- Ber, LSe41b he worked out with General Cotrowen 2iplan for an invasion of North Africz:_aad sent it back to the President. Natucaliy Langer defends not only the excluswam Df de Gaulle from the enter- prise bunt neglects to mention adccuate!y the roku ofithe non-rcactionary clements Pasticigneatingiin support of the invading Admericans. The authentic UFrench Resistance leaders are quoted as wanting de Gaulle, sibeat Murphy cabled Ceneral DBonovan on September 5, 19982, that de Gaulle might “SSbe capable of treachery.” m Se de Gaulle was excluded. “@ ~The Darlan portion of the ' bask is another whitewash ‘s Which adds little to the previ- x08 apologias. But it sounds oud, aiftet kanger has described the in- ceptiowa of expediency and the role of Musrphy,:to read that the “State De- partmesast:-had nothing to do with’ the arrangesments with Darlan. And it is nothimes -fessithan shameful that Langer Should& ‘dismitss the large number of known: facts about the political back- grouns®i :of the assassination of Darlan with: xa. few obscure phrases such as “there: swrereccurious circumstances.” S ersizhistion of history, the key to tinel>bank is Langer’s view that “comsxzderations of an ideological char- acter zarcidangcrous if they are made te = ce ee ae ptt wee 2 oot pie Nadie cana a? easel 0 pnb Ra boy 0 Bl eT ee . reed agy 460 heme: ee eat ted haa