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AD 72A (Rev. 8/82) @ ® to Fenton’s agitated statements, Leventry called the local police department, resulting in Fenton’s arrest. Officer Price subsequently contacted Hugya and apprised him of Fenton’s statements. See dkt. no. 127, at 58. Hugya then called FBI Agent Dale Frye. Id. at 69. Fenton was subsequently indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) for threatening Murtha (Count I) and Hugya (Count II). On Fenton’s motion, I dismissed Count II, holding as a matter of law that Hugya was not an “official” within the group of protected persons enumerated in § 115. United States v. Fenton, 10 F. Supp.2d 501 (W.D. Pa. 1998). The case was tried to a jury in July 1998, which returned a verdict of “guilty” at Count I, threatening Congressman Murtha. II. Fenton contends, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, that the evidence introduced by the government at his trial was insufficient to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). In deciding the question of sufficiency, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and the conviction must stand unless it appears that there was no substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Cooper, 121 F.3d 130, 133 3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Obialo, 23 F.3d 69, 71-72 (3d Cir. 1994), The statutory provision under which Fenton was indicted provides, in pertinent part: I also granted in part Fenton’s motion to suppress certain evidence, United States v. Fenton, Crim. No. 98-1J, 1998 WL 356889 (W.D. Pa. May 28, 1998), and denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on account of alleged prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury, United States v. Fenton, Crim. No. 98-1J, 1998 WL 356891 (W.D. Pa. June 29, 1998). Familiarity with those opinions is helpful, but not necessary, to an understanding of this memorandum.