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AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) retaliate.” Snelenberger is unhelpful, however, because of the limited argument that the defendant made in that case. Defendant had communicated his threat to kill an administrative law judge in the context of a conversation he was having with a psychotherapist, id. at 801, and contended that § 115(a)(1)(B) would be constitutionally overbroad absent an intent that the therapist communicate the threat, id. at 803. “His theory [was] that discussion between a therapist and patient is akin to writing personal thoughts in a diary.” Id. The court rejected that argument, however, holding first that the issue was waived in the district court,"° id. at 803, and second, that because he had uttered the same threat to an orderly who was transporting him, see id. at 801, his “‘diary’ analogy [was] inappropriate.” Id. at 803. Snelenberger’s pronouncement, then, is nothing more than unclear dictum which provides no doctrinal roadmap on intent to retaliate. The more substantial of the government’s arguments is that, under Patillo, a present The analysis the court did provide is somewhat cryptic: The [district] court analyzed the statutory language in response to Snelenberger's request. The court held that the first part of § 115(a)(1)(B), which states that it is a crime for someone to threaten a judge "with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such ... judge ... while engaged in the performance of official duties", requires that the threat-maker intend that the threat be communicated to the judge because the threat-maker wanted to influence the judge's action. The court held that the second part of the statute merely states that the threat be made with the intent to retaliate against the judge after the judge had acted. The court held that it was not required that the threat-maker intend that the threat should be communicated to the judge. Since Snelenberger's action fell within the second part of the statute, there was no need for an instruction such as he requested. We hold that the court's reading of the statute was entirely justified. 24 F.3d at 803. 10 The court did not consider whether, notwithstanding defendant’s waiver, there was plain error in the district court’s ruling. 16