◆ SpookStack

. suggestion of Captain Ivanov. Stephea Ward's point was that the. § . Government locked to the United Kingdom as the only hope of sug in this crisis: and that the United Kingdom should call a summit cosifikrance > to resolve it. Stephen Ward, on 24th October, 1962, telephoned the - Office and said that Lord Astor had recommended him to contact Sir Caccia: and be put forward the suggestion of a summit conference. On 25th October, 1962, he got Sir Godfrey Nicholson to meet Captain Ivanov wo a? —) a; oe and then, at Captain Ivanov’s request, to go to the Foreign Office with the a same proposal. Stephen Ward afterwards himself telephoned to the Foreign Office about it. On the same day he got Lord Astor to speak to Lord Arran. Lord Astor told Lord Arran that there was a Russian official (no doubt it was Captain Ivanov) who was seeking to pass information of an urgent nature to the British Government. Two days later, on 27th October, 1962, Stephen Ward took Captain Ivanov to Lord Arran’s house. Captain Ivanov told Lord Arran that he wished to convey a message to the British Government by indirect means asking them to call a summit conference in London forthwith. He maintained that Mr. Khrushchev would accept the invitation with alacrity, and thus the United Kingdom would break the deadlock. Lord Arran suspected that this was an attempt to drive a wedge between the United Kingdom and the Americans. He reported it both to the Foreign Office and to Admiralty House. 43. All these efforts by Stephen Ward failed. It so happened that on Sunday, 28th October, 1962, there was another party at Cliveden. Lord Astor’s guests included Lord Arran. Stephen Ward and Captain Jvanov came up to the house. While they were there news came through over the broadcast that the Russian ships had turned back from Cuba. Captain Ivanov could not, indeed, did not, conceal his anger and discomfiture. All the guests noticed it. 44. Looking back on the incident, Stephen Ward told me that he felt at the time that he was doing something momentous, but afterwards he realised - that it was of little real significance. I accept that Stephen Ward's activities, although misconceived and misdirected, were not deliberately mischievous, and I am giad to say that over this critical period the efforts of Stephen Ward and Captain Ivanov did not have the slightest effect on any of the people whom they approached—except to make everyone more suspicious of them than ever. (iii) Name Dropping 45. Shortly after the Cuban crisis, on 31st October, 1962, there was an incident which will illustrate the way in which Stephen Ward was apt to drop names of well-known people which led to unfounded rumours about them. In the evening of 31st October, 1962, Mr. William S. Shepherd, M.P., went to Stephen Ward's house. He found, as he says, Captain Ivanoy there, Christine Keeler, and also Marilyn Rice-Davies. (She was another of the girls whom Stephen Ward found and she was currently living in his house.) Theg@id not know that Mr. Shepherd was a Member of Parliament. The cony pturned to the Cuban crisis. Mr. Shepherd said it was a victory for the Agi Captain Ivanov became very angry. When Mr. Shepherd got up t to Ward said, referring to Captain Ivanov and himself, “ we must - —_. We are going to have dinner with Iain Macleod,”—which Mr. ‘thought was an extraordinary thing. This was a typical distortion of the truth by Stephen Ward. They were not going to have dinner with Mr. Macleod at all. 17 eran ea Pc SP