◆ SpookStack

(3) The Security Service had been, told in of 26th September, 1952, that their task as a whole, that they were strictly to limit their work and that no enquiry was to be carried out on bebellfef: any’ Government Department unless they were satisfied that an Sip public interest was at stake, bearing on the Defence of the Mitakn as. , ‘ obte ew ORT a whole (see paragraph 238). =~) © fae 268, J think that Directive explains the three important decisions of the Security Service at this juncture. The Directive is imperative that they are not to meddie with anything which is not clearly and specifically their business as a security matter: and having come to the conclusion, as they did, that. there was no security risk involved, they did not think it right to pursue. the matter further. I cannot blame them for this decision. The one point of difficulty is whether, having been sent for to Admiralty House on Ist February, they ought not to have followed it up by their going on their own initiative to Admiralty House on 7th February when they received the police report: . the Lord Chancellor in his inquiry held that they should have done, and in | failing to do #0, they had committed an error of judgment. But he did not . have the Directive before him, and having regard to the strict terms of the ve Directive I would not myself find them at fault in mot going to Admiraity House. . (ix) Am Unprecedented Situation 269. Nevertheless the fact remains that the police reports of 26th January and 5th February, 1963, did not reach any Minister until 29th May, 1963: and it has been suggested that they should have done. If the Security Service is not to blame, who is to blame? ‘ , 270. I think the explanation is that this was an unprecedented situation for which the machinery of government did not cater. It was, in the view of the Security Service, not a case of a security risk, but of moral misbehaviour by a Minister. And we have no machinery to deal with it. | (x) Subsequent Events 271. After the three important decisions of Ist, 4th and 7th February, 1963, the Security Service took no further part for some time. On 27th March, 1963, the Home Secretary asked the Head of the Security Service to come and seem him. He wanted to be put into the picture. The Head of the Security Service gave him a full report: and followed it up by considering whether there was any ground for prosecuting Siephen Ward under the Official Secrets Act (paragraph 196). Then when the Security issue was raised by Mr. Wilson, the Security Service reported fully to the Prime Minister (paragraphs 210-213). Do . _ 272. This concludes the operation of the Security Service in this affair. I find that they covered the security interest fully throughout and reported to those concerned, Their principal interest was in Captais Ivanov, the Russian Intelligence Officer: and secondarily in Stephen Wegil, as a close friend of his. They took all reasonable steps to see that the gil of the country were defended. In particular they saw that Mr. Profaagit and another Minister were warned of Ward. They kept the Forcign Office Silty informed. There is no reason to believe that there was any security leakage whatever. LL. 90 cen ee i een cae ene tne een