◆ SpookStack

espionage contexts, where lawfully-obtained CPNI has enabled law enforcement and national security agencies to prevent terrorist acts and acts of espionage.'? The courts have likewise long recognized the importance of telephone records to the administration of justice — both to law enforcement in the investigation and prosecution of serious offenses, such as illegal drug trafficking and organized crime, and to defendants in establishing an alibi defense.'" Thus, a mandatory destruction requirement — particularly one tied to a point in time completely unrelated to these purposes, i.e., when records cease to be “needed for billing or dispute purposes” — would inevitably result m the loss of critical information to many such investigations and cases.'° Moreover, a mandatory records destruction regime would be particularly inappropriate, because it could hinder efforts to counter intemational terrorism. Lawful access to communications records is a critical tool in the fight against global terrorism. Such records, when combined with other investigative information, can be used to establish the movements and identities of known and suspected terrorists. Mobile phone records, for example, were instrumental in tracking down the perpetrators of the Madrid 13 Td. at 6-7. " See, e.g. U.S. v. Hanardt, 173 F. Supp. 2d 801 (ND. IIL 2001) (phone records helped establish defendant’s “long-time connection to Chicago organized crime”), U.S. v. Seala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (cellular phone records showed numerous calis between defendant and known organized crime figures), Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that “toll-billing records have become an invaluable law enforcement aid” and that information from toll-billing records has been used by state and federal law enforcement officials in criminal investigations and prosecutions for over 50 years). See also Butler v. State, 716 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (telephone toll record was the key factor in establishing alibi defense). 5 We note that any mandatory data destruction requirement would also largely negate the utility of the existing data preservation scheme under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f); if the data relating to a specific investigation has been destroyed, there will be nothing for providers to preserve in response to a request from law enforcement.