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First off, | think it's a fiinction of the fact that, post-9/11, a number of agents were moved into the counterterrorism area and the director directed that no lead ina counterterrorism case would go unpursued. So there is a directive to agents that they must cover all counterterrorism leads. That's point one. But I think point two was, because we were focusing nich more on an intelligence- driven reaction to counterterrorism threats, the toolbox that we were using was focusing mostly on national security letters, as opposed to the prior reaction, which would have used grand jury subpoenas to get the same records. SENSENBRENNER: OK. Mr. Fine? FINE: I agree with Ms. Caproni. Prior to the September 11th attacks, it was rarely used. There were delays in getting them, and they were not following the !eads that they would have followed after the 9/11 attacks. FINE: After the 9/11 attacks, they were attempting to connect the dots, they were attempting to track down leads. When there are indications from a terrorists overseas that there might be connections to the United States, they try and follow it. SENSENBRENNER: My time is running out. You know, [ just make the observation that one of the things thal gets peopte in this town in big trouble is overreaching. I think that, given your report, Mr. Fine, the FBI has had a gross overreach. What this does is it erodes support for the function that the FBI does to protect all of us from future terrorist attacks. You know, I hope that this would be a lesson to the FBI that they can’t get away with this and expect fo maintain public support for the tools that they need to combat terrorism. Given the way the FBI has acted, [ have my doubts. But let this be a warming. And my time is up. CONYERS: The chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Bobby Scott. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fine, you've suggested that there's some confusion in how to work these things. There were, as J understand it, representations that there was an emergency when, in fact,