◆ SpookStack

1631 -HQ-1462938 AL-ZUBAYDI) was the senior Ba’ath Party official in the Northen Region. AL-ZUBAYDI admitted during an interview that he failed to control the on-going Kurdish activity within his jurisdiction. In approximately March, 1987, HUSSEIN relieved AL-ZUBAYDI of his position in the Northen Region and ordered AL- ZUBAYDI back to Baghdad. On March 29, 1987, HUSSEIN, through RCC Decree 160, appointed AL-MAJID as the RCC and the Ba’ath Party Regional Command representative who was empowered to implement their policies in the Northern Region which included the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan. This decree gave AL-MAJID control of the state’s civil, military, and security apparatuses in the Northern Region, including the Autonomous Region. AL-MAJID’s authority and special power far exceeded AL-ZUBAYDI'’s. AZIZ, a longtime RCC member, stated that HUSSEIN unilaterally chose AL-MAJID and defined the scope of the authority RCC Decree 160 granted AL- MAJID. AZIZ stated that HUSSEIN successfully seized the RCC’s authority and decision-making ability from its members in the early 1980s. The RCC did not discuss or vote on the appointment of AL-MAJID. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004] [RCC Decree 160 attached as document XX]. KHUDATYER examined a photocopy of RCC Decree 160 and recognized it as the copy of an authentic RCC document in format and substance. KHUDAIYER did not remember attending any meeting at which the contents of RCC Decree 160 was discussed. Rather, he recalled receiving the information via handwritten instructions as usual. He vaguely recalled making a non-substantive correction on the original draft that hig legal section had prepared. KHUDATYER stated the difference between AL-MAJID's appointment and AL-ZUBAYDI's was that AL-ZUBAYDI received his position based on his Ba'ath party status, not a Decree issued through the Presidential Diwan's office. Furthermore, AL- ZUBAYDI did not enjoy the trust from HUSSEIN that AL-MAJID did. When asked to define what he meant by trust, KHUDAIYER explained that everyone knew AL-MAJID would never do anything against SADDAM, and that he possessed the ruthlessness needed to quell the violence. [KHUDATYER interview, June 12, 2004] PRE-ANFAL (1987) On March 10, 1987, the Iraqi Directorate of Military