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1631 ~HQ-1462938 the Anfal was criminal in nature. AZIZ added he "would not have done this" and it was "not his way of doing things." [AzIz interview, February 2, 2004}. AZIZ acknowledged that, in the sense of collective responsibility, he should be held answerable for what the government did in general terms, but the man who holds the full accountability is HUSSEIN. Originally, when AZIZ was in the RCC, members received a typed letter with the agenda items for each meeting. Once decisions were made, they were typed up and signed by each member. The decisions were not implemented until all the RCC members signed. Tn the early 1 9 8 0 s to pe The Antal Campaigns: February - September = HUSSEIN decreed the Chairman of the RCC : Poshrarga mae BS comenana vy Ven fit) could decide matters fa Roownchrin! Reiner on behalf of the — =e entire RCC. Later, he eee a decided anything nN wos. decreed by the Rcc ent * sosmanaie would become law. In 7 fea 7 | addition to these wo J | irae legal measures which a . an ee essentially turned the |” Wart RCC into HUSSEIN’S personal "rubber stamp," there was the chilling effect of the Sau July, 1979 meeting . : where Ba’ath members re were killed. This made the proposition of disagreeing with HUSSEIN a life or death matter. [AZIZ interview, May 6, 2004]. SABIR provided a historical account of the events that eventually led to the Anfal Campaign. The Irag-Iran War was ongoing, and the Iraqi military successfully concluded a four month battle in Basrah. After the battle, the Iranian military continued to shell Basrah, causing the Iraqi military to draw forces from other battle fronts to defend the city. Iran discovered an Iraqi troop shortage in the Northern Region of Irag, particularly in the area of Suleimaniyeh. Iran took advantage of the situation in the Northern Region and conspired with Kurdish opposition groups led by BARZANI and TALABANI. The momentum of the war shifted toward Iran, prompting Iragi Government officials to develop a new strategy. According to 60