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security risks, -- a general houge-cleaning that took place {n \, the State Department before the initiation of the President's |. Loyalty Program. Since, in the Department of State, the loyalty and security functions are now carried on by the same Board at , the same time, under the same regulations, it may for our purpose be considered a single program. I wovld like you to'take a look , at this program, -- let's look at it as though it were & criminal ’ proceeding. Let's consider the crime and the standard of guilt, the prosecution and type of evidence admitted, the defense and the constitutional guarantees, and the tribunal, the Loyalty and Security Board. I will have to remind you constantly, however, a that it la not a criminal proceeding, but an adjudication of a a privilege. oO an ae ° pee t The first thing in such a program to catch the lawyer's eye is the standard of guilt. ‘Under the originel Executive Order 9835 the standard in loyalty cases was “that on @11 the evidence reasonable grounda exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States". In the security regulations of the Department of State, however, "if. @ reasonable doubt exists" the Board was directed to give the | Department the benefit of the doubt. By a new Executive Order 10241 of April 28, 1951, the President hae prescribed a new Standard for loyalty cases -- “that, on all the evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States". This is the equivalent of what has been all along the standard of the State Department in adjudging security risk. This standard of “reasonable doubt". is, of course, the very antithesis of the common law standard of reasonable doubt in criminal cases. In & criminal case a man may be convicted only if guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In loyalty cases he 1s removed from employment if there is a reason- able doubt az to his innocence. Instead of the State having to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, the accused has to prove his innocence (41.e. his loyalty) beyond a reasonable doubt. The only justification for the stiffness of the standard and tne burden on the accused is that it is not Guilt that is being adjudicated, but merely a privilege of em- picyment by the Government of the United States. It in of im- Fortance to lawyers, however, to note that in loyalty and security cases, as now adjudicated, the oddy are against the employee. then ; in this dislovalty to the Government of the United States, or this security risk, of which government employees: must be cleared beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to qualify ‘for employment by the Government? Fundamentally, disloyalty to the Governinent of the United States comes under one or the cther of two heads, -- it 1a either the attitude of ‘a person who seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconsti- tutional means, or it is action preferring the interests of another government over the interests of the United States Government. Under the firet head come the subversives, -- the advocates of revolution, force and violence; under the latter head come the spies, saboteurs, ~- the persona who intentionally disclose con- fidential information or perform their duties 60 as to serve the interests of another nation; under both hands come the communists, - for they both seek to alter the form of Government of the United i Stetes by violence, and they prefer to the interests of the U.S. Government, the interests of the Sotiet Union. Security risk is a@ broader concept, which ing lute di tiovalty. A security risk te a person who discleses classtfied Information without — authority. He may do it with the! 3 ledge or belief that 1t Will be transmitted to agencde-" 1%" & foreign government, tr he may + @imply be so conatstent ly dress 25 1p @ as to show extreme leok of care or judgment. In the fifhs. thse he would be disloyal, + in either case he ts a securit, + os. ae ® ~ . ; no . “ys oe . 7 TT a, ere Soe