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46 OCTOBER TERM, 1987. Opinion of the Court, 353, in eupport of his claim which would entitle him to relief? Here, the complaint alleged, in part, that petitioners were discharged wrongfully by the Railroad and that the Union, acting according to plan, refused to pro- tect their jobs as it did those of white employees or to help them with their grievances all because they were Negroes, If these allegations are proven there has been a manifest breach of the Union's statutory duty to repre- sent fairly and without hostile discrimination all of the eniployees in the bargaining unit. This Court squarely . held in Steele and subsequent cases that discrimination in representation because of race is prohibited by the Rail- way Labor Act. The bargaining representative's duty not + - to draw “irrelevant and invidious” * distinctions among those it represents does not come to an abrupt end, a3 "the respondents seem to contend, with the making of an agreenient between union and employer. Collective ‘+ bargaining is continuing process, Among other things, "sit involves day-to-day adjustments in’ the contract and " "+" other working rules, resolution of new problems not cov- ered by existing agreements, and the protection of em- , ployee rights already secured by contract. ‘The bargain- ing representative ‘can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these fuitctions than it can in negotiating a’ collective agreement.’ A contract may be fair and im- partial on its face yet administered in such a way, with the active or tacit consent of the union, as to be fagrantly discriminatory against some members of the bargaining unit. Seo, e.g, Leimer v. State Mutual Life Assur, Co, 108 F. 2d 302: Dioguardi v, Durning, 139 F.2d 774+ Continents! Collienes v, Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 8 Steele v, Louisville d Nashville R. Co. 323 U.S, 19°, 203, See Dillard v. Chesapeake «¢ Ohio R. Co., 199 F.2d 943+ Hughes Tool (‘o, v. Labor Board, 147 F.2d 09, 74, MS ces ~ a 2 eB CEESY ST FTE eR IT COTE oe “7% slat as _ 2 _ . Ae 2 1 elirgge tee TTR OT = = . bd . Pram-<to* teh oe 5 _* = eypress: oes “Es 3 EY are 7 cee ie he Se ee ee = - ne! : - CUNLEL U. UL0oU.y. “ tl Opinion of the Court. The respondents point to the fact that ni re Railway Labor Act aggrieved employees can file t " 0 " orievahtes with the Adjustment Board or sue HI a ployer for breach of contract. Granting his it st ie nishes'no sanction for the Union's alleged tein re in refusing to represent petitioners. The Railway L200 “Act, in an attempt to aid collective action by employees, conferred great power and protection on the nae agent, chosen by a majority of them. As indivi ut . sinall groups the employees cannot begin to Sane bargaining power of their representative tn negotiating with) the employer or in presenting their grievances to him, Nor may 8 minority choose another agent to bar gain/in their behalf. We need not pass on the Unions claim that it was not obliged to handle any grievances * at all because we are clear that once it undertook to bar gain’ or present grievances for some of the employees i | represented +t could not refuse to take similar action In, a good faith for other employees just because they vere, . Negroes. ; ere z the respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support sts general allegations of diserimination and that its dismissal i therefore prope, The decisive answer fo thsi that the Federal Rules of, Civil Procedure do not require @ claimant to set out in : detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. . To the” contrary, all the Rules require is “a short and plain state ment of the claim’”* that wil give the defendant fi notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon hich it rests. The illustrative forms appended ‘ the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplife “notice pleading” is made possible by the Liberal oppor tunity for discovery and the other pretrial. procedures ——— “sRule 8 ()2).