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6 Funk vs. United States. the common law itself by force of these changed conditions. Thus, as we have seen, the court in the Benson case pointed to the tendency during the preceding years to enlarge the domain of competency, significantly saying that the changes had been wronght not only by legislation but also ‘‘partially by judicial construc- tion’’; and that it was the spirit (not the letfer be it observed) of this legislation which had controlled the decisions of the courts and steadily removed the merely technical barriers in respect of in- competency, until generally no one was excluded from giving testimony, except under certain peculiar conditions which are set forth. It seems difficult to escape the conclusion that the spe- eific ground upon which the court there rested its determination as to the competency of a codefendant was that, since the de- fendant had been rendered competent, the competency of the co- defendant followed as a natural consequence. ‘Fhis view of the matter is made more positive by the decision in the Hosen case. The question of the testimonial competency of a person jointly indicted with the defendant was disposed of, as the question had been in the Benson case, ‘‘in the light of general authority and sound reason.'’’ The conclusion which the court reached was based not upon any definite act of legislation, but upon the trend of congressional opinion and of Jegislation (that is to say of legislation generally}, and upon the great weight of judicial authority which, since the earlier decisions, had developed in support of a more modern rule. In both cases the court neces- sarily proceeded upon the theory that the resultant modification which these important considerations had wrought in the rules of the old common law was within the power of the courts to declare and make operative. That the present case falls within the principles of the Benson and Rosen cases, and especially of the latter, we think does not reasonably admit of doubt. The rules of the common law which disqualifi¢d’-as witnesses persons having an interest long since in the main have been abolished both in England and in this country; and what was once regarded as a sufficient ground for exeluding the testimony of auch persons altogether has come to be uniformly and more sen- sibly regarded aa affecting the credit of the witness only. What- ever was the danger that an interested witness would uct speak Funk vs. United States. 7 the truth—and the danger never was as great as claimed—ita effect bas been minimized almost to the vanishing point by the test of cross-examination, the increased intelligenee of jurors, and perbaps other circumstances. The modern rule which bas removed the dis- qualification from persons accused of crime gradually came into foree after the middle of the last century, and is today universally accepted. The exclusion of the husband or wife is said by this court to be based upon his or her interest in the event. Jin Fuey Moy y. United States, supra. And whether by this is meant a practical interest in the result of the prosecution or merely a sentimental interest because of the marital relationship, makes little difference. Tn either case, a refusal to permit the wife upon the ground of interest to testify in behalf of her husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to testify for himself, presents a manifest incongruity. Nor can the exclusion of the wife’s testimony, in the face of the broad and liberal extension of the rules in respect of the com- petency of witnesses generally, be any longer justified, if it ever was justified, on any ground of public policy. It has been said that to admit such testimony is against public policy because it would endanger the harmony and confidence of marital relations, and, moreover, would subject the witness to the temptation to com- mit perjury. Modern Jegislation, in making either spouse com- petent to testify in bebalf of the other in criminal cases, has defi- nitely rejected these notions, and in the light of such legislation and of modern thought they seem to be altogether fanciful. The publie policy ef ane generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another, Pation v. United States, 281 U. 8. 276, 206. The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest--if they are to rest upon reason—is their adaptation te the suceesaful development of the truth, And since experience is of all teachers the most dependable, and since experience also is a continuous process, it follows that a rule of evidence at one time thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth should yield to the experience of a succeeding generation whenever that experience has clearly demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the ald rule. It may be said that the court should continue to enforce the old rule, however contrary to modern experience and thought, and