◆ SpookStack

8 Ashcraft et al. vs. State of Tennessee. lawyers questioned him without respite. From, the the _beginning of the questioning a at 7 o’clock on Saturday evening until 6 ° clock on Monday moruing “Asheraft denied that he had anything to do with the mprder_ of bis wife. And at a hearing before a magis- trate about 8:30 Monday morning Ashcraft pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder which the officers had sought to make him confess during the previous thirty-six hours. WH. +h citwatinen geank ac that hacen chaum hanoantradia ted we think a situation auch as. that here shown by uncontradic evidence is so inherently coercive that its very existence is irre- -eoncilable ‘With t | the possession of mental freedom hy a lone suspect against whom jts full coercive foreg is brought to bear.® It is in- conceivable that any court of justice in the land, conducted as our courta are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to keep a defendant witness tinder continuous cross exam- ination for thirty-six hours withon rest or sleep in an effort to ORR ry Raiae uy POULT CO ee th f0Re Ve extract a ‘‘voluntary’’ confession. ‘Nor can we, consistently with Constitutional due process of law, hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the same thing away from the restraining influences of a public trial in an open court room.’® The Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the convietion of any individual in an American court by means 68 TT 9 F890 Fre Feo ren glen $ Bram uw United Bta te! 3, i uu. 6. woe, aU, wus v0G 5 886 a156 Wan v. United States, °66 U. 8. 1, 14-15; Burdeau ’v. MeDowell, 256 U. 8. 465, 475; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 UL 8. 547, 573-574; 3 Elliot's Debates, pp. 445- 449, 452; ef. Chambers v. Florida, 309 v. 8. 227, The question in the Bram case was whether Bram had been compelled or coerced by a police officer to make a relf- incriminatary statement, contrary to the Fifth Amendment; and the ques- tion here is whether Asheraft similarly was coerced to make such a statement, ‘ontrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Lisenba v, California, 314 U. 8. 219, 36-238, Taken together, the Bram and Liaenba cases hold that a coerced or compejled confession cannot be used to conviet a defendant in any state or federal court. And the decision in the Bram case makes it clear that the ad- mitted circumstances under which Ashcraft is alleged to have confessed pre- clude a holding that he acted voluntarily. 1¢Compare the following allegation contained in Asheraft’s motion for new trial, ‘‘The Sheriff's deputies . . . set themselves up as a quasi judicial tribunal and tried . . . and convicted him there and in so doing rendered a trial . . . before the trial court . . . and the jury of peers .. . a mere formality,’’ with Ligsenba v. California. supra, p. 237. ‘‘The re- quirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he ig fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep hig triers keenly alive to a sense esomneana Liew ana the Gee emnetonann of thats #oinetinna a or their responsibility anu to MO BE) bea or bAIC LL LUELLA Cooley ’s Constitutional Limitations, Sixth Ed. (1890} p. 379; see also ‘Ked- dington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 459. “‘The aid of counsel in preparation would be farcical if the case could be foreclosed by a preliminary inquisition which would squeeze out conviction or prejudice by meana unconatitutional if used at the trial.’* Wood v. United States, 128 F. 2d 265, 271. Bee also Chambera ve. Plorida, supra, p. 237, Note 10, Ashcraft et al. vs. State of Tennessee. 9 of a coerced confession." There have been, and are now, certain foreign nations with governments dedicated to an opposite policy: governments which convict individuals with testimony obtained by police organizations possessed of an unrestrained power to seize persons suspected of crimes against the state, hold them in secret custody, and wring from them confessions by physical or mental torture. So long as the Constitution remains the basic law of our Republic, America will not have that kind of government. Second, as to Ware. Ashcraft and Ware were jointly tried, and were convicted on the theory that Ashcraft hired Ware to perform the murder. Ware's conviction was sustained by the Tennessee Supreme Court on the assumption that Ashcraft’s confession was properly admitted and his conviction valid., Whether it would have been sustained had the court reached the conclusion we have reached as to Ashcraft we cannot know. Doubt as to what the State caurt would have done under the changed circumstances brought about by our reversal of its decision as to Ashcraft is emphasized by the nosition of the State’s renresentatives in this Rte et wl) aoe pee te BSED Dpa tee Oe core Court. They have asked that if we reverse Asheraft’s conviction we also reverse Ware’s. In disposing of cases before us it is our responsibility to make such disposition as justice may require. ‘‘ And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered.’’ Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, 607; State Taz Commission v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511, 515-516. Application of this guiding principle to the ease at hand requires that we send Ware’s case back to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Should that Court in passing on Ware's conviction in the i light of our ruling as to Asheraft adopt the State Attorney General's view and re- verse the conviction there then would be no occasion for our pass- ing on the federal question bere raised by Ware. Under these circumstances we vacate the Judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court affirming Ware’s conviction, and remand his ease to that Court for further proceedings. The judgment affimminy Asheraft'’s eony oely oO [ona S it] i] “4 o “4 oD a E, fe rm < the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Tennessee for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, Ti is so ordered. 11 Chambera v, Florida, 309 U. 8. 227; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U, 8. 629; White v, Texas, 310 U. 8. 530; Lomax v. Texas, 313 U. 8. 544; Vernon rv. Alabama, 313 U. 8. 547; Lisenba v, California, 314 U. 9. 219, 236-238; Ward ry Pesas $10 17 S AST "85> ond wee Ream a Writed Stetes TAS TT Ata