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Pendergast vg. Untted States. 5 Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, held that this statute of limita- tions was applicable to an action of debt for a penalty. Chief Justice Marshall stated that it would be ‘‘utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws'’ to allow such an action to lie ‘‘at any distance of time’. Id., p. 342. That observation is equally apt here. Pro- ceedings like the rate litigation out of which this prosecution arose might well continue for years on end awaiting final disposition of all the funds. If there is a contempt, it takes place when the ‘‘mis- behavior’’ occurs in the ‘‘presence’’ of the court. Statutes of limi- tations normally begin to run when the crime is complete. See United States y. Irvine, 98 U. 8. 450. Every statute of limita- tions, of course, may permit a rogue to escape. Yet as Chief Justice Marshall cbhserved in Adams v. Woods, supra, p. 342, *‘not even treason can be prosecuted after a lapse of three years’’. That was still true at the time of this offense. See R. 8. § 1043, 18 U. 8. C. §581, There is no reason why this lesser crime, punishable without some of the protective features of criminal trials, should receive favored treatment. But it is said that the contrary conclusion is to be inferred from Gompers v. United States, supra, because this Court took pains to point out that its ruling was applicable only to proceedings for contempt ‘‘not committed in the presence of the court.’’ 233 U. S. p. 606. But that reservation, made out of an abundance of caution, also extended to ‘‘proceedings of this sort only” (id., p. 606) viz. proceedings where no information was filed. Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 314, sanctioned summary punishment for ‘‘direct con- tempts’’ committed in the ‘‘presence’’ of the court. The question whether that procedure could be followed ‘‘at a subsequent term, or at a subsequent day of the same term’’ was specifically reserved. Id., p. 314. That is a procedural problem peculiar to direct contempts in the face of the court (see Ceoke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517) and obviously has no relevancy to the problem of the statute of limitations. The prosecution contends, however, that the offense consisted in the imposition of a fraudulent scheme upon the court, that successful execution of the scheme required not only mizrepresen- tions to the court but continuous cocperation in concealing the scheme until its completion, that the fraud on the court would not be fully effected until 80% of the impounded funds was distributed to the insurance companies and $750,000 paid by Street and divided among petitioners. On that theory the fraudulent scheme, thongh