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t on 4 wiser rs a of it leaves us with a statute still on the books that proecribes certain tee actions, but yet the de of proof necessary to operate under the few ae ‘ remaining areas is such that there was no satisfactory way to proceed, 3 and it was an area where—— ; The CHatexwan. Will the Senator yield at that point, please? What . you are saying, Mr. Adams, is that you did not operate within the law because the law didn't give you sufficient latitude. Therefore, you ’ undertook direct action to disrupt and otherwise undermine these organizations. nator Tower. Did you proceed on the assumption that these organizations would eventually break the law, and therefore you sought Om we nssten linn am a so oaiot to neutralize and disrupt them before they aia’ Mr. Apams. I can't say that, sir. I think that the investigations of them were based on this belief, that they might break the law or they | were breaking the law. The disruptive activities, I can’t find where we were able to relate to that. What it boils down to is what we have gotten into a question on before: in our review of the situation we see men of the FBI recognizing or having a good-faith belief that there ‘ was immediate danger tothe United States, Senator Towen. All right, but to repair to Senator Church’s question, - you don’t say that you really had specific legal authority ? ; } Mr. Avass. No. And this isthe hang-up with the whole program, and : which we are not trying to justify, that there is some statutory basis. ° I would not make that effort whatsoever. All I’m trying to do is say that at the time it was initiated, we had men who felt that there was j an immediate danger to the country. They felt they had a responsibility i to act, and having felt this responsibility, did act. And this is the whole : { wrohlam we hava at tha nreeent time haranea wa de havea nna wa ran Qr a Ueresusee FE we SSR PY GA EER PF Ee RAE RP OR LA A FO wally rea Was see good evidence of their belief there was a threat. We had cities being 1 burned ; we had educational institutions being bombed. We had deaths occurring from 2]! of these activities, We had a situation that we didn’t \ know what the end was going to be. | _ We never can look around the corner in intelligence operations. We don’t know if ultimately this might bring the destruction of the coun- try. All we know is we had an extremely violent time. So I don’t find any basis in my mind to argue with their good-faith belief they were faced with a danger. Now, when they move over to the second area of responsibility. here m, and I think it is the whole purpose of t ‘ 16 Wheres We HAVE tne prove | this committee, the Attorney General, Mr. Kelley, all of us realizing 4 q fo whaes we hae, tha neh, { we can’t operate in these nreas where we feel responsibility, but we don’t have a mandate by Congress. So in that area, this feeling of \ responsibility I feel came from the fact that Presidents, as your staff said yesterday, Presidents. Congressmen. the Attorney General. no one really provided direction and guidance or instructions don’t do this, do this. don’t do that, or what are you doing and how are you doing it. For instance. there is some feeling on the part of some that our whole domestie intelligence operations was secret. The COINTELPRO operation was. I mean, I think we all agree that this was, to be effec-, tive, they felt it should be sécret. But back in our—this is printed ap- propriation testimony which went to the members of the committee. It ‘ was mailed out to newspapers, friends, anyone that was interested in it, -0TT O+ 8-8 inte igs ap ont anny al ict a tat Cea ce Ae TAN geo tae, Scan +4 et Bh hice} A ips 4 geen hee te ely oe) ' hs COT Tete ed alae et CaS aety td been te on tetera tat Swng Te te Bee apt le] i a aro ao oy : Lo. Pot tea sy . ety vet soe UM gt a Rat teh ep dye A, 9 . . * » ? 4 * = " . x OST Mee ae WE a AS Shen soe BBO aR: a * -