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268 513 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT provides that suit may be brought either in the United States District Court for the - District of Columbia or in any federal dis- trict court in the state which the senator or member of the House represents, irrespec- tive of the distance between that state and the District of Columbia and irrespective of any connection between that state and the judicial appointment sought to be chal- lenged. In short, what the statute appears to authorize is a mechanism whereby a senator or member of the House of Representatives may challenge in a federal court in his or her home state the validity of the judicial appointment of a single person, Judge Mikva. Such a statute has, at one level, an entirely salutory purpose, for it would be antithetical to the rule of law that all government officials, and judges in particu- lar, are pledged to uphold if a federal judge were permitted to take office in violation of the express terms of the United States Con- stitution. The statute is, however, proble- matic at quite another level, for under arti- cle III of the Constitution federal courts may decide only cases and controversies properly brought before them, by parties with sufficient stake in the dispute to en- sure that a decision by the courts is not inconsistent with the limited role the courts must play within our tripartite federal sys- tem of government. The fact that the stat- ute makes senators and members of the House, and no others, “enforcers” of the 6. The Supreme Court described the concept of justiciability in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968): Embodied in the words ‘‘cases” and “contro- versies” are two complementary but some- what different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role as- signed to the judiciary in a tripartite alloca- tion of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Justi- ciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine. Constitution in the judicial forum impli- cates special concerns regarding the separa- tion of powers. ~ JUSTICIABILITY The federal courts have consistently exer- cised care -to limit their jurisdiction to the case and controversy requirement of article III. This governing principle is more easily stated than applied, however, since compre- hended within the limitations imposed by the terms “cases” and “controversies” are concerns about the proper functioning of courts in dispute resolution and the alloca- tion of power among the three branches of government. (1] Our initial analysis of the unusual statute before us embraced a full range of inquiry into the various aspects of justicia- bility.© We conclude, however, that one of its aspects—the requirement of standing— is dispositive. Article ITI requires that the parties to a lawsuit have “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illu- mination of difficult constitutional ques- tions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The issue confronting us is whether Senator McClure has such a personal stake. The interpretations of the doctrine of standing are manifold. The Supreme Court One aspect of justiciability not raised by the parties, but which gave this court some pause, is the possibility that this court has been asked for an advisory opinion, an idea that is incon- sistent with the “case” or “controversy”. re- quirement of the Constitution. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911). ; Although the statute the Senator relies on is facially similar to the statute found ineffective in Muskrat, the differences are significant enough to remove the case from the proscrip- tions of whatever remains of the Muskrat ra- tionale. See, e. g., Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 96 S.Ct. 1793, 48 L.Ed.2d 274 (1976); South Carolina v. Katzen- bach, 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). Thus, we are not asked for an advisory opinion. has consider texts and h quirements i of the forn sense that : mined until merits; only certainty th: have a prote she suffered provides a tween injury and whether ments for sti Court has at show a distir she may hav: g., Jenkins-v 89 S.Ct. 184 More: recent plaintiff mu: of interests” constitutiona question. A Service Org. US. 150, 90! In other case a plaintiff n to satisfy the article III. 1 na_ Environ US. 59, 98 (1978); Unit ing Regul (SCRAP), 41 L.Ed.2d 254 have standin strable legal in fact and, ' ble legal clai person witha standing, alt in some lin may give su based on a ri interest thro about public Club v. Mor S.Ct. 1861, 1 Metropolitan Clean Air v. 809, 814 (D.\