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Adel Nasrallah — Part 2
Page 132
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On April 7, 1989 the Fund’s independent directors retained special counsel for the purpose of: (i)
conducting an independent inquiry inte the facts relating to the acquisition for the Fund of ADR's of Nigel
in excess of 10% of the outstanding class of securities of Nigel of which they represent a part; (ii) analyzing
the measure of damages which would be applied if the Fund’s investment Adviser were liable for losses
resutting from this investment; and (iii) analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the claim the Fund may
have against the Investment Adviser as a result of the purchase described in (i) above. Special counsel
concluded such investigation as it deemed it appropriate and submitted a report on its findings to th?
independent directors. Based upon their analysis of that report, the independent directors concluded that it
would not be in the best interests of the Fund to pursue its claims against the Investment Adviser baséd on
the Nigel transaction because: (i) such a suit would be very detrimental to the operations of the Fund; (it)
there is some question of whether or not the Investment Adviser would have any legal liability since such
liability would exist only if the Investment Adviser were shown to have acted with willful misfeasance, gross
negligence or bad faith; and (iii) even if Jegai liability were established, there is considerable question
whether the Investment Adviser would have to pay damages to the Fund, and if so, how much such
payments would be. The independent directors have concluded that the best action for them to take is to
assure that future transactions will be more carefully monitored. They will, therefore, require that an
independent compliance officer be retained and that the Investment Adviser resolve problem areas raised
by the SEG in connection with its investigation of the investment Adviser.
On November 6, 1987, Investments engaged the Funds’ independent accountants to compute the
unrealized loss involving the investment by Investments in Nigel in excess of 10%. A preliminary report was
issued by the accountants in which certain assumptions were made. Upon review of the report, the
Investment Adviser questioned those assumptions and, consequently, the results of the report. The
Investment Adviser calculated the value of the Nigel investment in excess of 10% at the time of tender to be
approximately $1.65 million. On the basis of the current market value of this stock as of August 15, 1989,
the maximum unrealized loss to investments would bei in excess of $1.4 million. This unreatized loss will
fluctuate based on the current market value of Nigel. :
The SEC staff has raised questions concerning the lAdependence of the disinterested directors, and the
possible breach of fiduciary duty by the directors including disinterested directors with respect to their
actions and inactions in connection with the Nigel transaction. In addition, certain directors including some
disinterested directors have also purchased stock of Nigel. Furthermore, the SEC staff has expressed a
concern with respect to the liquidity of Investments” ‘portfolio in view of the staff's belief that there is a
limited market and low trading volume in Nigel shares and other securities in the portfotio. As of August. 15,
1989, Nigel comprised less than 1% of fhe total valuation of the portfolio of Investments.
3. Transactions of Strategic Gold /Minerals Fund, Ine. (Gold/Minerals”) ©
“One of the Gold/Minerals Fund’s investment restrictions provides that Gold/Minerals may not, without
shareholder approval, purchase or retain the securities of any issuer if those officers and directors of
Gold/Mineralts or the Investment Adviser owning individually more than 1/2 of 1% of the securities of such
issuer together own more than 5% of the securities of such issuer. In addition, Section 17(d) of the 1940
Act generally prohibits joint transactions involving registered investment companies and their affiliates
without an application and prior SEC approval. As of March 1, 1985, Dr. Brenna, an officer and director of
the Funds and the Investment Adviser, had acquired shares and warrants issued by ORS Corporation
(“ORS”) that, in the aggregate, exceeded 5% of the outstanding shares of ORS if the warrants are treated
as securities for purposes of the investment restriction. Special counsel for the Funds is of the view that
warrants should not be a part of the calculation relating to the above investment restriction. During the
period from April 18, 1983 to December 3, 1984, Gotd/Minerals also purchased securities and restricted
14
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