◆ SpookStack

“ ’ r 4 etting a view of the battlefront from the window of his epecial plane jorm Troop organizations would ; wielded by any German ruter, He Amocinied Preas «ke a vacation for a month be-[proclaimed himself Fuehrer and inning July 1. During that peri-' ‘ordered a plebiscite for approval J 4t- was intended to disbandjof the consolidation of the pow- fiose formations considered unre-lers of the President and Chancel- 4 Fable and reorganize the entire vownshirt army. This met resist- xe and Roehm demanded a show- towne 4 ‘On June 20 and the following lor under tnat tilie. The plebiscite was held on Aug, 19, The approval vote was overwhelming. From that moment Hitler em- barked upon his bold program in the domain of internal and foreign aie personal direction Roehm and affairs, a program that led to the Sy Roehm received it. Under Hit- é were - associates o General van Scnijeicher. ire as punishment for revolt| minat his avihority and decia-ec. Mgt the weifare of the German, @dple required drastic action. He. d it exceeded 1,060. tarcely had the conefernation wed by these executions died Wan when the nation was treated another surprise, On Aug. 2. aM; President von Hirdenburg on his estate at Neudeck. ssia. He had been ili for some | Within a space of s fewlunder the blowg of Allied arms Hitler announced that he|Germany fell to the lowest estate J taken over the powers of the|experienced by any nation in mod- é murdered.'masa rearmament of Germany, YF the victima of the “purge”|making her once more a great/ after the fall of France. At the right he looks over damage caug i military power, reoccupation and : ' i re. 8 Reichatag apeech on Julytmilitazization of the Rhineland, {- German town by Allied bombers ‘GE. Hiller sought to justify the the annexation of Austria, the! occupation ef Czechoslovakia, the seizure of Memel, Dang and the Polish Corridor, the destruction of Poland, seizure of Denmark and -the number killed was sev-|Norway, the conquest of Holland, yekiven, but other sources de-| Belgium, Luxembourg, France and the Balkans, the invasion of Rus- gia, and the long domination of the European Continent by Nazi Ger- many. It ali ended, however, in the con- Ormation of Napoleen's dictum: “Empires die of indigestion.” With the fall of Hitler's empire} wsident in addition to those offern times. ancellor, thereby vereling hitm- wt putocratic History will determine Hiller's { degree of respensibility for s conduct of military operations bring the war. It was known that $e was frequently in disagreement th his generals, who had been itlined to urge greater caution han he had exhibited on many crit- eal occasions. He wax encouraged in Ale daving at eruciat moments efore the war by what appeared to im the unwillingness or unreadi- eas of France abd England to ster into collision with Germany. Thus it was at the time of the erman Invasion of the Rhineland, f the occupation of Austria and uring the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938. It ts probable that ai the time of the diplomatic conflict with Poland, immediately preceding the utbreak of hostilities, Hitler felt at Britain and France would ac- @ept another Munich and yield to ‘Gis demands on Poland. This may regarded by the future historian|after the reverses that compelled |July, 1843, would likewise fail to s his first great mistake. | ; That was Hitler's contribution to authority never'the history of the “master race.” Defeat of Germany on East and West Fronts jin the carly years of the war but- ‘tressed his self-confidence, fanned (by the adulation heaped upon him | bs: his press, which pictured him 'a5 & great militsry genius. After the fall of France in June, 1940, he lgave vent to his exuitation by dancing an impromptu jig on the sidewalks of Paris, an act that the newsreels recorded for the entire world to see. . His personal resporsibility for the invasion of Russia jn’ June, 1040, was never denled. The great ‘in{tial victories of the Germana in Russia were also attributed to his alleged uncanny military talents. Less than two years later, how- ever, jt had becorme clear that hia invasion of Russia, which cost Ger- many millions of lives, was another and perhaps the greatest of his errors. For a few months it had seemed that his plans in Rusia [eter be crowned with success, but 1 the German retreal from Moscow hea enueht ta caver in ihe sethack "ep Hitler in high and low spirits. In 1940 he danced his femou- Atpociated | German generals, removing Field|the political blow ‘ealt to'the. Marshal Gen. Watther von Brau-jin Itesty he sent a squad of | chilsch &s Commander in Chief and ‘chutists in September of that announcing that he would take|to rescue Mussolini front his Personal charge of military opera-jfinement behind-the:-Aliies” . tions. — ‘ The rescue enabled Hitter tye The development of the cam-|lish a puppet Mussolini’ go paigns in Russia led subsequently jment in northern Italy, which | to one disaster after another. The|tioned wniil the entire Italian, loss of a Germar, army of 300,000|collapsed under .mgio-Amer at Stalingrad in February, 1843,/blows. On April 28, 1945, Mu was attribuled directly to Hitinr's{lini was captured by Italian bad strategy in ordering the Ger-|tisans and executed. At that man forces to hold on to the enditime Hitter waa reported de when a timely rotreat might have|dying or in Berlin. | +'*+, saved that army. While ‘Hitler's public az His declaration of war on thelances declined in frequency United States. in support of Ja-|the progress of the war towa! Pan and in agreement with Italy,/climax of Germany's defea' on Dec. 11, 1941, marked an-jutterances againat her -oppc other fateful day in his career. Itigrew in violence and vituper was at least as grave a mistake as|He ridiculed the. Allies’ leads his invasion of Russia. He was ap-{"military idjots” and boaste¢ parently convinced that he would|thelr armies, would never ba be able to bring Russia to herjto land on the Continent” | 4 knees hefore the United States| Proof of the fatal effects could make its power felt fn Eu-jler’s interference with his gen rope. Moreover, he believed thatlin the conduct of milltary the United States would be toc(tions was obtained in dott busy in the Pacific to take any de-jcaptured by the Allies short cisive part in the European strug-ler thelr invasion of Normar gle. He was also reported to believe|June 6, 1844. By the middle c that Japan would strike at Russiajit had become clear to, G immediately after Germany's dec-|military and civilian leader, laration of war on this country and/their country Had lost the wi thus help drive Russia out of thejthat the elimination of Hitl war within a few weeks or months. {essential to salvage what ws Laicr he was reported to have ac-|sible from the wreck. A gn cused of Japan of treachery in not/conspirators resolved to r doing so. him from the scene. On Jy Aa the military situation grew/1044, he was painfully burs more ominous for Germany, Hitlerja bomb. woe. swept aside the authority of his/ The assassination attem— generals and announced that hejattributed to a band of g would exercise complete direction/and other officers. Hund: of the war, guided by his “intul-}pergons, Including some tion.” He minimized the importance| guished military men invo of the Alles’ landings in French|the conspiracy, were execu: North Africa in November, 1942,|the Government's terror and tried te make his people be-j“defeatists’ waa intensified lieve that the invasion of Italy|gradually disappeared fron and the overthrow of Mussolini inJalthough orders and pro¢tla continued to be issued in hi prevent German victory. In the last few weeks of 1 To buttress the tottering struc-jit had beegmge: rent thal mare