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DOW-UAP-D48, Department of the Air Force Report, 1996
Page 83
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8. Summary
In RTI's risk-computation program DAMP, vehicle failures per se are not considered.
Instead each catastrophic failure is assumed to· produce one of five failure responses,
and it is these response modes that are modeled in DAMP. Although most catastrophic
failures result in impacts near the flight line, less likely malfunctions may cause debris
to fall either uprange or well away from the flight line. In DAMP, vehicle failures with
this potential are, for the most part, classified as Mode-5 failure responses. The
resulting impacts are modeled by a rather formidable-looking density function that
includes two shaping constants (A and B) that strongly influence the nature of the
impact-density function. To obtain absolute probabilities (or risks), the function must
be multiplied by-a probability-of-occurrence factor (p5). The primary purpose of this
study was to determine the best values for A, B, and p5 for various vehicle programs.
Other objectives not explicitly included in the statement of work were to develop
absolute failure probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan and to derive relative
probabilities of occurrence for the five failure-response modes in DAMP.
Although some risk analyses may ignore unlikely failure-response modes, Section 2
demonstrates the _need for a Mode-5 response - or some similar response - through
brief descriptions of actual vehicle flights. Section 3 and Appendix B provide the
reader with a fuller understanding of the nature and intricacies of the Mode-5 impact-
density function. Together, they show how density-function shaping is affected by
values of A and B, and in particular how the Atlas IIAS launch-area risk _contours
change if the value of A is changed.
Section 4 is a philosophical discussion of methods of assessing vehicle failure
probability (or reliability). Two approaches are discussed, one strictly empirical, the
other a parts-analysis method that involves the assignment of failure probabilities to
individual parts, components, and systems. Although difficulties exist with both
approaches, the empirical method was chosen to estimate both absolute and relative
failure probabilities.
-As the first step in estimating failure probabilities empirically, performance histories
were gathered, summarized, and tabulated (Appendix D) by launch date for Atlas,
Delta, and Titan vehicle launches from the Eastern and Western Ranges, and for Thor
launches from the Eastern Range. Obtaining this information, and assigning response
modes and associated flight phases for each failure consumed a large portion of the
effort expended on this task.
A filtering (i.e., data weighting) technique was selected (see Section 5.1 and
Appendix C) and applied to the launch failure data to estimate overall failure
probabilities by flight phase (see Section D.1.3) for Atlas, Delta, and Titan vehicles. The
recommended failure probabilities are based on test results involving only those
vehicle configurations that are considered to be representative of current launch
9/10/%
74
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