◆ SpookStack

ed to an interview with an official in the Akmo Agri- cultural Ministry. From this discussion and from iers in Moscow, as well as from our own observation in Centra! Asia, we conclude that the whole vast experiment represents an enor-. mous gamble. Rainfall is the key to success or failure, and rain- fall per year averages only a marginal 12 inches. With a weather break, good crops will be produced, as they were in the first year (1954) of the experiment, but in a dry year they will fail. Even- tually enough snow fences may be built and wind breaks planted to help hold moisture and top soil, but in the meantime it seemed likely to us that several years of consecutive drought might turn the whole region into a dust bowi, especially in view of the wind which seems to sweep constantly across the flat plain. The land itself is adequate, but we were advised that some fertilizer is. necessary and is being widely used. No irrigation is attempted, since the engineering and supply problems are to great for present Soviet resources, although irrigation is a theoretical possibility. It is too early to predict with any certainty the chances of success without irrigation. All that can be said is that if the project succeeds, it will make a major contribution to the solu-. tion of the Soviet farm problem. If it fails, it will be a failure of vast proportions, carrying with it the hopes and dreams, if not the lives, of great numbers of Soviet citizens. On the basis of our own inadequate visit, and bearing in mind the drought conditions which prevailed in the course of it and may have inffuenced our view, we are inclined to the opinion that ihe new lands are not the basic answer to the Soviet agricultural prob- Iem. Dramatic as is the experiment, we suggest that a more fundamental answer must be found on the farms of European Russia, an answer which will result in inereased produetivity on existing farms, especially in the fertile Ukraine.