◆ SpookStack

be inclined to agree with" district court's treatment)). Indeed, they have reached that conclusion in cases involving prolonged GPS monitoring. See People y. Weaver. 909 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (N.Y.2009) (Prolonged GPS monitoring *yields ... a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations-political, rchigious, armicable arid auriorous, to name oniy a few-and of the pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits'); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash.2003) (en banc) ("In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails and foibles. The GPS tracking devices record all of these travels, and thus can provide a detailed picture of one's life."). *14 A reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each place he stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each of those movements to remain (1970) (Breitel, J., concurring). In this way the extended recordation of a person's movements is, like the "manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on' canvas bag in Bond, not what we expect anyone to do, and it reveals more than we expect anyone to know. 529 U.S. at 339 3. Was Jones's expectation of privacy reasonable? It does not apodictically follow that, because the aggregation of Jones's movements over the course of a month was not exposed to the public, his expectation of privacy in those movements was reasonable; "legitimation of expectations of privacy must have a source outside the Fourth Amendment," such as "understandings that are recognized or permitted by society," United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.22 (1984) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12). So it is that, because the "Congress has decided .. to treat the interest in 'privately' possessing cocaine as illegitimate, "governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest." Id. at 123. The Government suggests Jones's expectation of privacy in his movements was. unreasonable because those movements took place in his vehicle, on a public way, rather than inside his home. That the police tracked Jones's movements in his Jeep rather than in his home is certainly relevant to the reasonableness of his expectation of privacy; "in the sanctity of the home," the Court has observed, " all details are intimate details," Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. A person does not leave his privacy behind when he walks out his front door, however. On the contrary, in Katz the Court clearly stated "what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 389 U .S. at 351. Or, as this court has said, outside the home, the "Fourth Amendment ... secur[es] for each individual a private enclave, a 'zone' bounded by the individual's own reasonable expectations of privacy." Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. AT & T, 593 F.2d 1030, 1042-43 (1978) 18 TTUOTD 007099