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42. McCone, “Memorandum of Discussion with Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Friday, October 5, 1962, 15 p.m.” Memorandum of Discussion with Mr. McGeorge Bundy Friday, October 5, 1962, 5:15 p.m. 1. McCons reviewed details cf the Donovan negotiations, discussions with the President, Attorney General, Eisenhower, the decisions not to approach Congressional leadership, the discussion with Senator Javits, and the final report from Donovan. Bundy expressed general agreement. 2. At the October 4th meeting of the Special Group Mongoose was dis- cussed in some detail as was the meeting with Carter, Lansdale, et al in DCI's office on that day. McConse stated there was a feeling in CIA and Defense that the “activist policy" which founded the Mongoose operation was gone and that while no specific operational activities hed been (refused) the araount of "noise"! from minor incidents such as the sugar, the students firing on the Havana Hotel and other matters and the extreme caution ex- pressed by State had led to this conclusion. More importantly, however, the decisions to restrict U-2 flights kad placed the United States Intelligence Community in a position where it eould not report with assurance the development of offensive capabilities in Cuba. McCone stated he felt it most probable that Soviet-Castro operations would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs. McCone stated he thought this @ probability rather than a mere possibility. Bundy tock issue stating that he felt the Soviets would not go that far, that he was satisfied that no offensive capability would be installed in Cube because of its world-wide effects and therefore seemed relaxed over the fact that the Intelligence Comraunity cannot produce hard information onthis important subject. McCone said that Bundy's viewpoint was reflected by many in the Intelligence Community, perhaps a majority, but he just did not agree and furthermore did not think the United States could afford to take such a risk. 3. Bundy then philoscphized on Cuba stating that he felt that our policy was not clear, our objectives not determined and therefore our efforts were not productive. He discussed both the Mongoose operations and the Rostow “Track Two". Bundy was not critical of either or of the Lansdale operations. It was obvious that he was not in sympathy with a more active role such as those discussed at 5412 on Thursday as he felt none of them would bring Castro down nor would they particularly enhance U.S. position of world leadership. Bundy seemed inclined to support the Track Two ides and also inclined (though he was not specific) to play down the more active Lansdale